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On December 7, 1962 the Chase Manhattan Bank published in the New York
Times what it termed "An Important Announcement from the Chase Manhattan
Bank to All People Who Are Self-Employed."' The announcement stated that
self-employed persons could for the first time take part in "tax-approved pension or
profit-sharing plans." 2 Then under a caption entitled "WHAT WE'LL Do," the Chase
Manhattan Bank stated that it expected to establish two trust funds-a fixed-income
trust fund and an equity fund---"For investment purposes of self-employed retirement plans." The announcement went on to state that the person setting up the
self-employed retirement plan had the right at the time each contribution was
made to select either or both funds as the investment medium for such contribution.
The announcement elicited an almost immediate response from the Chief Counsel
of the Division of Corporation Finance of the Securities and Exchange Commission 3
who warned that the Chase Manhattan Bank had made a public offering of a
security without complying with the registration requirements of the Securities Act
of I933. This warning was greeted by some people in banking circles with an
appearance of surprise. It also provoked a stormy reaction from the Comptroller
of the Currency who stated that his investigations had led to "far different conclusions of law" than those announced by the Chief Counsel of the Division of
Corporation Finance.' Although the banking fraternity had not been unaware
* This article bears a date of June 5, 1964.
"-A.B. 1954, LL.B. 1957, Harvard University. Visiting Professor of Law, Duke University. Consultant, Securities and Exchange Commission. Member of the New York bar.
$ A.B. 1951, LL.B. 1957, Harvard University. Special Counsel to Securities and Exchange Commission on Investment Company Act Matters and Associate Director of its Division of Corporate Regulation. Member of the District of Columbia bar.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private
publication by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the authors' colleagues on the staff of the Commission.
'N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1962, p. 29, cols. 2-7.
' The announcement refers to the Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, 76 Stat.
809 (1962).
'The response came at a session of the Practising Law Institute in New York City, held on Dec. 7,
x962, which was devoted to a discussion of pension and profit-sharing plans for the self-employed.
4 48 Stat. 74 (s933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (1958), as amended, 55 U.S.C. § 77b-77h
(Supp. IV, 1963)

[hereinafter cited as Securities Act].

'Letter from James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency, to William L. Cary, Chairman, Securities
and Exchange Commission, Dec. z8, z962, in Common Trust Funds-Overlapping Responsibility and
Conflict in Regulation, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 134 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Fascell Hearing].
Interestingly, in the course of the Fascell Hearing, which investigated the relationship of the federal
securities laws to certain aspects of the Comptroller of the Currency's Regulation 9, 12 C.F.R. pt. 9,
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that their offering of interests in commingled funds as the investment media for
retirement plans raised questions under the federal securities laws," these reactions are
to some extent understandable in light of the Commission's traditional reluctance
to take action to apply the federal securities laws to pension plans in any but a
narrow category of cases or to bank commingled funds in which only the assets of
pension plans were invested.
The basis for the Commission's reluctance to act in the retirement plan area has
never been clearly articulated; nor has the appropriateness of applying the federal
securities laws to some or to all of the many forms of such plans been thoroughly
analyzed. This neglect is surprising in light of the increasingly important role
which pension plans play in the American economy. The development of pension
plans, as a supplement to the social security system, represents a major effort in the
American economy to find a satisfactory answer to the need for providing a degree
of economic security for those who have reached retirement age. Growth in the
size of pension plans has been phenomenal. Ten years ago, the book value of private
non-insured pension funds was $ii billion; today it is over $46 billion. Net receipts
totalled $2 billion a year in the mid-i95os and $4 billion annually in 1962-63: It has
been estimated that they will amount to $6 billion annually by i97o and $8 billion
annually by i98o.7
later amended by 29 Fed. Reg. 1719 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Regulation 9], Mr. Saxon testified that
the advertisement of the Chase Manhattan Bank "would be proscribed under our regulation." But see
note xi6, infra.
He pointed out that "there can be no question of any mass merchandising under our regulation."
Fascel Hearing 48. In a letter "To All National Banks and State Banks Operating Common' Trust Funds,"
dated April 5, 1963, which accompanied the revision of Regulation 9, Mr. Saxon stated that a bank which
published "an advertisement which made other than incidental mention of its common trust fund in
the course of advertising the range of the bank's fiduciary services, would violate this Regulation." The
advertisement of The First National City Bank of New York with respect to self-employed retirement
plans which was published in the New York Times on Tuesday, Dec. 3, 1963, appears to be an
example of the kind of advertisement which Regulation 9 contemplates. As of June 5, 1964, the Securities
and Exchange Commission had taken no action against The First National City Bank of New York for
publishing this advertisement.
0
In x96o, in connection with an earlier version of the Self-Employed Individual's Tax Retirement Act
of 1962, the American Bankers Association formally requested the Commission to join with it in
proposing an amendment to the bill which would exempt interests in self-employed persons' retirement
plans either from all of the provisions of the Securities Act and Investment Company Act of 1940, 54
Stat. 789, 35 U.S.C. §§ 8oa-2 to -39 (Supp. IV, 1963) [hereinafter cited as Investment Company
Act], or from all of these provisions except the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act. The
Commission declined to do so and the language was not presented by the Association to the Congress.
No similar discussions were held or similar language proposed in connection with the Self-Employed
Individual's Tax Retirement Act of z962 itself.
'Fortune, Feb. 1964, p. 198. SEC Statistical Series Release No. 1978, June 4, 1964. The market
value of these funds is slightly higher than $54 billion. Ibid. In addition to the assets of these
private non-insured pension plans, there are today about $23 billion in insured pension assets. Forbes,
April 1, 1964, P. 37. In contrast, it is interesting to note that the assets of the principal social
security fund, the Old Age and Survivor's Insurance Trust fund, amounted to only $x8.5 billion at the
end of 1963, while the assets of the retirement systems of the state and local governments amounted
to $27 billion. SEC Statistical Series Release No. 1978, June 4, x964, See PAUL P. Hau.iaCTrr, PEaNSlON
FUNDS AND ECONOMIC POWER 237-50 (1959), for a discussion of the potential growth of pensiosf funds

and the channelling of their investments. This excellent book discusses the impact of private noninsured pension plans upon the ownership and control of productive property in the United States.
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This article will analyze pension and profit-sharing plans by attempting to
identify the interests they contain and the extent to which the federal securities laws
should appropriately be used to protect those interests! In making this analysis,
self-employed retirement plans will be used as a primary frame of reference. The
principal conclusions which are reached can be summarized as follows. The general
reluctance of the Commission to apply the Securities Act to pension and other
employee benefit plans that do not involve the sale to employees of securities in the
employer company appears appropriate. Different considerations, however, are
involved in connection with offerings of commingled investment funds, such as those
described in the advertisement of the Chase Manhattan Bank mentioned at the
beginning of this article, to large numbers of relatively unsophisticated employers
as possible investment media for their H.R. 1o plans. The registration and disclosure provisions of the Securities Act should in general be applied to such offerings.
The provisions of the Investment Company Act have not been applied to qualified
pension plans (including H.R. 1o plans) at either the employer or the commingled
fund level. Although this seems appropriate at the level of the individual employer
plan, at the level of the commingled fund the similarity of the H.R. io commingled
fund to the typical investment company creates difficulties of articulating adequate
policy reasons for the distinctions drawn in the act between funds which are exempt
and funds which are not.
I
Tn HR. 10 PLAN
for
the Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement
name
H.R. io, the popular
Act of 1962, provides a vehicle by which self-employed persons are granted some of
the favorable tax benefits which are available in connection with qualified pension
plans established by employers for their employees.? (The latter type pension plan
It points out many of the important questions which the growth of these plans raises. See Securities
and Exchange Commission, Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, pt. 2,
88th Cong., ist Sess. 837-70 (1963), for a description and analysis of the way pension funds and
other institutional investors execute stock transactions and utilize the securities markets.
'This article will not discuss the extent to which the "blue sky" laws or other state legislation
protect the interests of pension plan participants. Most state blue sky laws either specifically exempt
from their operation "investment contracts" or "securities" issued in connection with an employee's
stock purchase, savings, pension, profit-sharing or similar benefit plan, see, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw
§ 3 59 -f-2.(e) (Supp. 1963), or grant an exemption if the state securities commissioner is given notice of
the plan a specified period before its inception. See, e.g., N.J. Rav. STAT. § 49: 3-3(a)(5) (Supp. 1963).
For a summary of the treatment given to pension plans under state blue sky laws, see P-H PENSION &
PROFIT-SHARING RaP.

623x (,963-64).

'Partners and individual proprietors (neither of which are considered "employees" under the Internal
Revenue Code, except under the special provisions of H.R. io)_ have always been able to set up qualified
pension funds for their employees; but the only way they can cover themselves under a qualified plan
is by setting up an H.R. zo plan. The tax advantages of traditional employee qualified pension plans
remain much greater thain those extended to H.R. io plans. This point was articulated in the following
manner in the minority views appended to the Senate Finance Committee's report on H.R. io:
"The bill fails even to accomplish its major ostensible objective of equating retirement privileges of
the self-employed with those of the executive of closely held corporations. To achieve parity in this
regard, limitations of considerable stringency would need to be placed on corporate executives. The
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will sometimes be referred to in this article as an employee pension plan in order
to distinguish it from the self-employed person's pension plan which will usually be
referred to as an H.R. io plan.) The tax advantages to a self-employed person in
establishing an H.R. io plan are two-fold: A deduction can be taken for at least a
part of his contribution to the plan; and the income earned on his contributions
after they have been invested under the plan is tax exempt until distributed to him.
The amount which a self-employed person can contribute for himself in any one
year under such a plan is in general limited to the lesser of ten per cent of his earned
income for such taxable year derived from the trade or business with respect to
which the plan is established, or $2,5oo.10 Only fifty per cent of the amount so contributed by the self-employed individual for himself is deductible." As a condition
of establishing an H.R. io plan, the self-employed person must include under the
plan all his employees (except part-time and seasonal employees) who have three
or more years' service in the trade or business with respect to which the plan is
established; and he must make contributions on their behalf on a basis at least as
favorable as the basis on which the contributions on his own behalf are made.12
Such employees may be permitted by the plan to make voluntary contributions.
These are not deductible by the employees but the earnings on them are tax
exempt until distributed."3 All contributions made with respect to employees are
required by H.R. io to vest in the employees immediately (i.e., they must be nonforfeitable) 14
Contributions made pursuant to H.R. i0 plans may be funded in any one or more
of the following ways:
(i) By deposit of the funds in a trust of which a bank is the trustee. The statute
committee refused to acknowledge this fact and summarily voted down all attempts in that direction."
S. REP. No. 992, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 56 (1961).
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §404(e)(i). For the special treatment applicable to self-employed

persons who are not "owner-employees," see note ii infra.
11
INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a) (so). The Code classifies self-employed persons into two
groups: The first group consists of persons who are defined in § 40(c) (3) as "owner-employees."
These are persons who are sole proprietors and partners who own more than a io% capital or profits
interest in a partnership. The rules described in the text are those which apply to owner-employees.
For self-employed persons who are not owner-employees (i.e., partners who do not have a greater-thanso% capital or profits interest in the partnership) a somewhat more liberal rule applies. Their contributions to the plan on their own behalf are not limited by the lesser of io%-of-earned-income or $2,500 test
mentioned above. But the deduction they may take for their own contributions is limited to 5o% of
that portion of their contribution which does not exceed the lesser of io% of their earned income from
the partnership or $2,5oo.
" Ir.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 401(d) (3). The contributions made by the self-employed peron
on behalf of his employees are deductible in full by him, and are not currently taxed to the employees.
3
Voluntary contributions made by an employee generally should not be permitted to exceed io% of
his compensation for the taxable year. See Rev. Rul. 59-185, 1959-1 Cums. BuLL. 86.
If the plan permits voluntary contributions to be made by employees, the self-employed person is also
permitted to make voluntary contributions on a comparable basis. No part of these voluntary contributions is deductible. Voluntary contributions made by an owner-employee are limited to the lesser of xo%
of his earned income from the trade or business or $2,500. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 9§ 401(c) (1) (B)
(ii), (iii).
"' INT. Razv. CODE OF 1954, § 401 (d) (2) (A).
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does not place any limitation on the investments which the trust may make. And
it permits persons (including the employer) other than the bank to have the power
to determine what these investments will be. One of the possible investment media for
the trust is a bank commingled fund. Other possible investment media would include
shares in mutual funds or closed-end investment companies, or face-amount certificates issued by registered investment companies. The trustee is required to file
information returns regarding the trust with the Treasury. If the trust uses annuity,
endowment, or life insurance contracts of a life insurance company exclusively as its
funding medium, the trustee need not be a bank if the life insurance company files
certain information returns regarding the contracts with the Treasury.
(2) By investment of the funds directly in nontransferable annuity contracts.
The term "annuity" includes variable annuities, and face-amount certificates issued
by registered investment companies. The company issuing the contracts is required
to file information returns regarding the contracts with the Treasury.
(3) By establishment of a special custodial account with a bank, if the funds in
the account are invested solely in shares of regulated investment companies, as
defined in section 851 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which issue only
redeemable shares, or solely in annuity, endowment or life insurance contracts. The
term "annuity" includes variable annuities, and face-amount certificates issued by a
registered investment company. The custodian is required to file information
returns regarding the account with the Treasury.
(4) By investment of the funds in a special series of United States bonds, registered in the name of the employee. These bonds may be held directly since they
are nontransferable and can only be redeemed under specified circumstances.
In general, each individual H.R. io plan will be small. The number of participants in the plan and the assets contributed in their behalf will be relatively limited
(this will be particularly true in the early years of the plan). As a consequence, it
will not be practical to provide adequate diversification or management for the investment of the assets in such plans unless the assets of a large number of such plans can
be commingled. Banks which offer H.R. 1o programs do so on the assumption that
a substantial number of such plans will be established with them, and, as the Chase
Manhattan advertisement mentioned at the beginning of this article indicates, that
the assets of these plans will be invested in their commingled funds. One bank
predicted that it would have i8,ooo H.R. xo participants within one year after commencing its H.R. io program. Failure to obtain a large number of H.R. io plans
and to commingle their assets for the purposes of investment management would
result in banks having to charge higher fees or operating their H.R. 1o programs
at a loss.' 5
"' So far the high hopes for the widespread use of H.R. zo plans do not appear to have been realized.
The principal reason seems to be that from the self-employed individual's point of view participation in an
H.R. io plan may create costs that could well outweigh any immediate tax saving which is secured. See
Hoffmann, Many Limitations of H.R. zo Make Its Use Generally Undesirable, 18 J. T AXTioN =8
(x963).

8oo
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Although H.R. I0 plans may take the form of pension plans under which
definitely determinable benefits are paid out and to which actuarially determined
contributions are made, it seems more likely that such plans will be profit-sharing
plans (so that contributions will be required only in profitable years) and that pay
outs under the plans will vary with the success of the investment of the assets
contributed to the plans. The plans which have been registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission contemplate that a substantial part of the contributions
to the plan will be invested in securities.'
One way of setting up an H.R. io plan-and the one with which we will be most
concerned for the purposes of analysis-is for the employer to create a trust, of
which a bank will be the trustee, to which the contributions on behalf of the employer and his employees under the plan will be made. The trust agreement will
describe the investment powers of the trustee. The trustee may be directed to invest
the funds contributed to the trust in one or more of the bank's commingled funds,
or partly in one or more commingled funds and partly in some form of insurance,
or the trustee may be given complete discretion with respect to the investment of
the trust assets; or the trustee may be told what percentage of the trust assets it
shall invest in commingled funds and what percentage in insurance, but be given
discretion with respect to the commingled fund or funds in which it will invest.
As indicated above, it is also possible for the trust instrument to provide that some
person other than the trustee-such as the employer or the participants through the
employer-will have the power to determine what the investments will be. For
example, the employer might retain the power to determine what portion of the
contributions in any year will be invested in the bank's commingled stock fund, or
its commingled balanced fund, or in annuity contracts or investment company
shares. The employer could also retain the power to switch existing investments.
Typically, the documents which will be used to set up the plan and the trust
created pursuant to it will be supplied by the sponsor of the H.R. io program. For
example, the American Bar Retirement Association, which sponsors an H.R. 1o
program for members of the American Bar Association, indicates that a copy of the
retirement plan, the implementing trust agreements, instructional materials and other
forms needed to adopt the plan can be purchased for $5.00. The First National City
Bank of New York advertises the availability of Master Pension Plans and Master
Profit Sharing Plans and a Trust Agreement form for use with each of these plans.
It appears that these plans and the trust agreements must be standardized in order
to achieve the necessary volume operating economies.' 7
See, e.g., American Bar Retirement Association Retirement Plan.
" See Announcement From the American Bar Association to Its Members, Nov. ig, 1963.
20
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Is THrE

A SECUI TY?

The federal securities laws are designed to protect investor interests. Thus, in
determining the applicability of the federal securities laws to a particular situation,
identification of an investor interest is required. Traditionally, the presence of such
an investor interest is premised in Securities Act terms on the existence of a "sale"
of a "security." The applicability of the concept of a "sale" in the pension plan
context will be examined in the next section. Here we shall examine the question
whether a "security" exists.
A "security" is defined in section 2(i) of the Securities Act to mean:
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, pre-organization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate . . . or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known
as a "security" ....

The House report on the Securities Act indicates that the term security is broadly
defined so that "the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall
within the ordinary concept of a security" will be subject to the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act.' The decisions of the courts construing the term
security have been characterized as liberal and as bringing within the act "many
forms of transactions which, on their face, do not appear to be 'securities' in the
commercial sense of the word."' 9
The Commission has concentrated its attention in the pension plan area under
the Securities Act almost exclusively on plans funded by a trust which invests in
securities, mortgages, or similar investments. This concentration appears related to
that fact that such trusteed plans have the characteristics of investment companies.20
In analyzing the status under the Securities Act of trusteed pension plans which invest
in or hold securities or mortgages or similar investments, the Commission has
traditionally taken the position that interests in such pension plans constitute "investment contracts" or "certificates of interest or participations in a profit-sharing
58

H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., ist Sess. Ir (1933).

Feldman & Rothschild, Executive Compensation and Federal Securities Legislation, 55 MICH. L.
REv. 1115, 1117 (1957).
'o As Commissioner Purcell testified before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
in 1941: "Many employee plans are in the nature of investment trusts and are indistinguishable in
legal effect from investment companies offering securities to the public at large. The Congress in the
o
Investment Company Act of 194 recognized this fact by providing certain limited exceptions from
the provisions of that act for 'employees' securities companies' in sections 3(c)(13) and 6(b)." Hearings
'o

on Proposed Amendments to the Securities Act of z933 and to the Securities Exchange Act of z934

Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 77th Cong., ist Sess. 895 (1941)
(hereinafter cited as the z94r Hearings]. Indeed, it appears that the Commission did not attempt to
apply the Securities Act to trusteed pension plans generally until about the time that the Investment
Company Act was being drafted. See id. at 958-62, 975, 994. Before that time the Commission seems
to have limited the applicability of the Securities Act to plans which provided for the purchase of
stock by employees in the employer company.
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agreement:"' An investment contract has been defined by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Howey to mean:
*..a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal
2
certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise
When the Supreme Court's definition of investment contract is applied to the
trusteed pension plan with which we are primarily concerned-the H.R. io trustthe existence of a security is clearly indicated. Money is invested in a common
enterprise (the trust which receives the contributions of the employer and his
employees), the management of which is committed to a third party (the trustee
and, in some cases, the employer or some other person) and from which profits (and
income) are expected. However, when the investment contract test is applied to the
bank commingled fund which may be used to pool the assets of various employercreated H.R. iotrusts, the result is less easily apparent. Since the trustee of each
employer-created trust is also the trustee of the commingled fund, if the trustee is
viewed as the "person" making the investment in the commingled fund there does
not seem to be, in substance, a third party to whom the management of the common
enterprise is entrusted. But to the extent that the trustee of the employer-created
trust is directed to invest in a particular commingled fund or to the extent that he
is given discretion to invest in a particular commingled fund and there is an understanding that he will do so or he uniformly exercises his discretion to do so, it is
really the employer who, in substance, makes the investment in the commingled
fund. In any event, there is no difficulty in viewing each employer-created trust as
having a "certificate of interest or participation in a profit-sharing agreement" as a
consequence of the arrangement by which each trust shares, pro rata in relation to
its contributions, in the success of the commingled fund.2
Where the issuer of the security is a trust, the identification of a security is only
1

Op. SEC Ass't Gen. Counsel (1941), 1 CCH FED. Sac. L. REP.

2231.21.

Perhaps because of its

concentration on the investment company nature of trusteed plans, Commission statements concerning

them do not distinguish between the plan and the trust which is used to fund it.
:2 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).

3 One of the important changes which Regulation 9 effected in the rules governing commingled funds
isthat in determining the placement of a particular participation in a fund, the entire fund as a whole
rather than each asset in the fund may be considered in determining the propriety of the particular
participation. Thus, even if one of the investments of the commingled fund would not qualify as a
proper investment for the participating account, the commingled fund may still be considered a proper
investment medium for the account. This reflects the adoption of an entity theory with respect to
the commingled fund. See Remarks of James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency, 4 4th Midwinter
Trust Conference of the American Bankers Association, Feb. 4, 1963; Letter To All National Banks and
State Banks Operating Common Trust Funds, April 5,1963, supra note 5.
The Internal Revenue Service has traditionally treated bank commingled funds set up as investment
media for qualified plans as separate entities. See Rev. Rul. 56-267, i956-i Cum. BULL. 206. In Rev.
Rul. 57-165, 1957-1 Cum. Bu.L. x67, the Service held that a transfer of property from the employer's
individual trust to the commingled fund constitutes an exchange resulting in the realization of gain
or loss by the individual trust. Similar treatment has been applied for tax purposes to traditional common
trust funds. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 584(e); U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.584-4(b).
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a short first step in identifying an investor interest. The broad scope of the terms
"investment contract" or "certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement" results in the issuance of a security almost every time a trust is created.
To preclude such a result, a person who issues a security was defined in section
2(2) of the Securities Act to exclude all trusts unless "the interest or interests of the
beneficiary or beneficiaries are evidenced by a security" (emphasis added). The
"security" to which section 2(2) refers cannot have the same meaning which the
term "security" is given in section 2(I). If it did, it would rob the last sentence of
section 2(2) of any limiting effect. What meaning the phrase does have can only be
interpreted in the light of the legislative history which indicates that the purpose of
section 2(2) was
... to exclude the ordinary noncommercial trust but to include ^that type of organization, commonly known as a "business trust" or a "Massachusetts trust," which without
resort to the device of incorporation, is used to achieve many of the purposes of the
ordinary business corporation2 4

The language "evidenced by a security" might perhaps be read to require some
tangible token of the beneficiary's interest in the trust or that such interest be transferable.25 However, it is clear that a business trust could be operated without issuing
certificates2" and without permitting the transfer of interests in the trust. Thus,
either or both of these readings would frustrate attainment of the congressionally
expressed purpose of the language. A line which may be drawn to achieve the
expressed legislative purpose is one suggested by Professor Scott in his treatise on
Trusts. He states that one useful classification of the principal purposes for which
trusts are created is "a general division into trusts created for the purpose of distributing the bounty of the settlor, and trusts created for business purposes."-"
Although there may have been a time when it was acceptable to view the creation
of a pension plan by an employer for the benefit of his employees as a gift to them,
RE. No. 85, 73d Cong., ist Sess. i1 (1933).
Beneficial interests in personal trusts are transferable unless such interests are expressly made inalienable by the terms of the trust or by statute or unless the interest is such that only the beneficiary
himself can enjoy it (a trust for his personal support) or that the beneficiary has nothing to enjoy
other than what the trustee in his uncontrolled discretion' gives him. 2 AusN W. Scorr, THErLAw oF
Tsusrs §§ 132, 154-55 (2d ed. 1956). If transferability of interests were the test, most personal trusts
would be considered as issuing securities.
"' The terms of any trust (including a definition of the interest of each beneficiary in the trust) will
typically be embodied in a document of some kind. If the "tangible token" can be construed to include
such a document, only oral trusts would be excluded by the limiting language of § 2(2) of the Securities
Act. The Comptroller of the Currency's Regulation 9, § 9.8(b)(I3) prohibits a bank commingled fund
from issuing "any certificate or other document evidencing a direct or indirect interest in such fund in
any form." The interest of the participants in the commingled fund is evidenced by a book entry
maintained by the bank. If the language quoted from Regulation 9 represents the correct construction
of "tangible token," a mutual fund such as Massachusetts Investors Trust could avoid having to
register its shares by not issuing certificates and keeping track of investor interests by book entries and
informing its shareholders of the amount of their interests by periodic reports.
7 2 SCOTT, TRusrs § 59, at 514 (2d ed. 1956).
"H.R.
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Much more appropriate is the characterization of the Senate
that time has passed.
Labor Committee, in its report on the Federal Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure
Act:2 9 "Regardless of the form they take, the employers' share of the cost of these
0
plans or the benefits the employers provide are a form of compensation."" Accordingly, where, as in a pension trust, the trust is created in connection with an employment relation or where, as in a commingled fund, the trust is created as an investment
medium by a person in the investment management business, the trust is created for
business purposes and is not non-commercial.
Where the pension plan does not involve a trust but is funded solely by insurance
contracts (other than variable annuities) which qualify as exempt securities under
section 3(a) (8) of the Securities Act, the Commission has indicated that the plan
does not involve the issuance of a security so long as the plan administrator does
not have discretion to invest employee contributions in something other than such
exempt contracts?' However, if the insurance contracts are held in a trust it would
seem that a security would be involved.
Because of the no-sale theory which the Commission has adopted and which is
described below, the Commission has never had to decide whether an unfunded plan
(i.e., a plan where the employer simply makes pension payments on a pay-as-you-go
basis out of the assets of the business to employees who have retired) involves the
issuance of a security. Logically, it is hard to understand why a distinction for the
purpose of defining the existence of a security should be made between a plan, the
obligations of which are funded in a separate pool, and a plan, the obligations of
which are "funded" in the employer's business.32 If the employer's plan to pay
28See HARBrEcHT, op. cit. supra note 7, at 177, 181-83; Note, Legal Problems of Private Pension
Plans, 70 HAIv. L. REV. 490, 494-95 (1957).
29 72 Stat. 997 (958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-09 (Supp. IV, 1963)

[hereinafter cited as the
Federal Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act].
" S. REP. No. 144o, 85 th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958) [hereinafter cited as the KEN4nEDY REPoRT].
81 1941 Hearings at 897. The Commission views the recently developed deposit administration group
annuity contracts which utilize the segregated account method of funding and have many of the
characteristics of a variable annuity or of a trusteed plan as being subject to the federal securities laws.
The Commission takes the position that the segregated account is an investment company for purposes
of the Investment Company Act and involves the issuance of a registrable security within the meaning
of the Securities Act. When the segregated account is used only for employee retirement plans which
qualify under § 401-04 of the Internal Revenue Code, the account has, for all substantive purposes,
the same characteristics as a qualified trust which is exempted from the Investment Company Act by
§ 3(c)(13) of the act. The Commission has accordingly exempted such accounts from the Investment
Company Act and from the registration provisions of the Securities Act if they meet certain conditions.
See Rule 3c-3, 17 C.F.R. § 270.3c-3 (1964); Rule 156, 17 C.F.R. § 230.156 (1964). Apparently the
Commission does not find an investment company or a registrable security to exist in a conventional
deposit administration group annuity contract which does not involve a segregated account. For a
general discussion of deposit administration group annuity contracts, see DAN M. McGILL, FUNDAMENTALS
OF PRIVATE PENSIONs 156-78 (2d ed. 1964). See p. 82r and note 529, infra for a discussion of Rule x56
and Rule 3c-3.
1 Compare In the Matter of Maritime Corporation, 9 S.E.C. 906 (1941). This case involved a
corporation organized to hold and invest the surplus funds of a business corporation pending utilization of
those funds in the latter's business. The shareholders of the corporation were substantially the same
as the shareholders of the business corporation. The Commission held that the corporation was entitled
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pensions is communicated to his employees and constitutes a binding obligation on

him to pay pensions to employees who satisfy the conditions of the plan, he has in
substance issued a contract in the nature of a contingent annuity. Such a contract
would appear to fall within one or more of the terms "evidence of indebtedness,"
"certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement," or "invest3
ment contract" and thus constitutes a security.
III
THE

INTEREST OF THE EMPLOYEE PARTICIPANT IN A PENSION PLAN

The determination that a pension plan involves the issuance of securities does no
more than suggest the existence of a possible investor interest which may require
some or all of the protections of the federal securities laws. Analysis of the nature
of the possible investor interest which exists in an individual case may cause one to
decide that it is not the kind of investor interest to which all of the protections of the
Securities Act should be applied. At times a decision that such protections should
not be applicable has resulted in a determination that a particular interest does not
constitute a security. 4 In this section we shall examine some of the factors which
help to determine whether the protections of the Securities Act should be applicable.
Our analysis will first focus primarily on the relationship between the plan participant and the plan. Later we shall examine more closely the commingled fund which
to exemption from the Investment Company Act under § 6(c) because it was "essentially a private enterprise to which it was not intended" the act should apply.
See also the Commission's position regarding employee savings plans, described in note 45 infra.
"5 This conclusion would seem to be confirmed by the negative implication contained in the § 3 (a) (8)
exemption from the provisions of the Securities Act for insurance contracts issued by an insurance company. However, the House Committee report describing § 3(a) (8) suggests that, even withouit the
exemption, insurance policies would not be regarded as securities subject to the act. H.R. Rap. No. 85,
73d Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1933); see I Louis Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 497 (ad ed. i96i).

At the

time the Securities Act was passed, the U.S. Supreme Court had not yet laid to rest the widely prevailing
notion that activities of insurance companies were beyond the reach of the commerce clause of the
Constitution. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). Nevertheless, there is no evidence that Congress intended to exempt every insurance-type contract issued
by any company-whether or not it is an insurance company. The fact that § 3(a) (8) describes the type
of issuing company with particularity seems to be persuasive evidence that Congress thought that insurance-type contracts issued by companies other than those "subject to the supervision of the insurance
commissioner, or any agency or officer performing like functions of any State or Territory of the United
States or the District of Columbia" were securities subject to the provisions of the Securities Act.
Commissioner Purcell testified in the 1941 Hearings that an employee welfare plan providinfg for
hospitalization benefits or sick benefits does not involve a security. He argued that such plans do not
involve the issuance of investment contracts because the payments are not made with a view to their
being invested and earning a return for the employees. 1941 Hearings 896. Presumably he would
have taken the same view of welfare plans providing for benefits in the event of unemployment, death,
or disability. However, it is hard to distinguish the expectation of return under these plans from the
expectations of return under any contract which pays a determinable benefit on the happening of a
described event. See id. at 922 (testimony of R. V. Fletcher, General Counsel for the Association of
American Railroads). As long as such contracts are not exempt under § 3(a) (8) of the Securities Act,
they would appear to fit the literal definition of a security.
" See the discussion in note 33 supra, concerning interests in certain welfare plans which have been
considered not to constitute securities even though the statutory language seemed to argue for a different
result.
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may be used as the investment medium for a pension plan and the relationship
between the commingled fund and both the employer setting up the plan and the
participants inthe plan.
Let us turn to the interest of the employee who participates in a pension plan.
He knows that one element of the compensation in his present job is coverage under
a pension plan. At a minimum, he should know the terms of that pension plan.
He should know what contributions are made to the pension plan, what benefits are
payable and what he must do in order to qualify for those benefits. If the pension
plan is one which qualifies for favorable tax treatment under section 401 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, he will get that information. The employer must
apprise his employees of the establishment of a qualified plan and its salient
provisions3 5 The Internal Revenue Service suggests that this requirement may be
most satisfactorily met by furnishing each employee with a copy of the plan. S
Furnishing the employees with a copy of the formal plan (which may in many
cases be a complex legal document) does not necessarily satisfy Securities Act disclosure standards which require that the facts must be disclosed in a form which is
clearly understandable to the ordinary investor.3 7 Many employers recognize that
the plan, itself, may be hard for their employees to understand and they furnish a
booklet (either instead of the plan or to accompany the plan) which explains in
simple language the plan's main features. This is acceptable to the Internal Revenue
Service so long as the employees are either given a copy of the plan or are told
where they may inspect a copy.3 s No similar requirement for telling the employees
about the terms of the pension plan is imposed under the Internal Revenue Code
when theyparticipate in a plan which does not qualify for favorable tax treatment
under section 401 of the Code.
Although all the participants in an H.R. io pension plan would receive information about the terms of the plan under this procedure (since this is a plan which
qualifies for favorable tax treatment under section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code),
there is no requirement imposed under the Code that such participants receive any
accounting concerning the administration and operation of the plan or about the
success of the plan in meeting its objectives. However, such information seems
important-especially in those situations, typical in H.R. io plans, where the level of
benefits is variable and depends on the quality of the investment management of
the pension plan assets. Even in those cases where the pension plan pays a fixed
level'of benefits, the employee seems entitled to receive enough information to know
whether he can properly rely on receiving his pension-to know, for example,
whether the fund has received sufficient contributions or has been managed in a way
which will permit it to pay such benefits.
Although it appears that the type of disclosure which the Securities Act requires
5 Rev. Rul. 61-157, 1963.2 Cum. BULL. 67, 74.
30 Ibid.

37 See In the Matter of Universal Camera Corp., 59 S.E.C. 648 (1945).
88Rev. Rul. 61-157, 196I-2 CuM. BULL. 67, 74.
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would be useful in protecting the interests of the employees in the plans covering
them, the Commission does not today require such disclosure in any but a limited
class of cases. In analyzing the Commission's position, it is useful first to consider
those plans which do not involve voluntary contributions on the part of the employees-i.e., where only the employer makes contributions to the plan on behalf
of the employees, or where, if the employees do contribute, their contributions are a
compulsory aspect of their employment. The Commission has taken the position
that the Securities Act does not apply to such plans because there is no "sale" or
"offer" for sale of the security. Section2(3) of the Securities Act defines these terms
as follows:
The term "sale" or "sell" shall include every contract of sale or disposition of a
security or interest in a security, for value. The term "offer to sell," "offer for sale," or
"offer" shall include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy,
a security or interest in a security, for value....
A sale or offer within the meaning of this definition must be present before the
provisions of the Securities Act are called into play. The Commission's position is
not premised on the theory that the interest in the pension plan was disposed of
without value or consideration in the common law sense? 9 Indeed, as we have
pointed out above, the employer's contributions to the plan are a form of compensation. This is even dearer in those cases where the employee is required to
turn back a portion of his compensation to the plan. Rather, the Commission's
view is premised on the ground that there is no offer or sale in the securities law

sense because "there is no element of volition on the part of the employees whether
or not to participate and make contributions."4 The employee must purchase the
interest in the pension plan-the only way he can refuse to make a purchase is by
quitting his job. In short, the Commission's position is that if the employee has no
real choice with respect to the medium in which his funds are invested there
"0At an earlier time it might have been possible to premise an exclusion for pension plans not involving a voluntary contributory aspect on the ground that the employer was making a gift to his
employees. Ganson Purcell, then Chairman of the Commission, articulated that argument in the 1941
Hearings. 1941 Hearings 896. This view was in accord with many court decisions dealing with
the question whether an employee had an enforceable contract right to receive a pension that had been
promised to him but which contained a disclaimer of liability clause. See HA.BRmcsT, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 181-83; Note, Legal Problems of Private Pension Plans, 70 HARV. L. REV. 490, 493-503
(1957). A major landmark of the shift that has been occurring toward the view that employee pensions
and the funds contributed to pension and welfare plans are wages was the decision in Inland Steel v.
NLRB, 77 N.L.R.B. i (1948), enforcement granted, 170 F.2d 247 ( 7 th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 960 (1949), holding that pension and retirement plans are a proper subject matter for compulsory
collective bargaining under the Taft-Hartley Act on the ground that such plans realistically viewed are
part of the entire wage structure. See HAt
EcHr, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 163-65.
"'Op.SEC Ass't Gen. Counsel (1941), 1 CCH FED. SEc. L. RaP. 2231.21. The Commission's

interpretation is not an easy one to fit in with the language of the statute which merely requires that
there be a "disposition of a security . . .for value" (emphasis supplied). The gloss which the Commission has placed on the-statutory language seems proper, however, in light of the scheme of the actto arm persons solicited in connection with a distribution of securities with sufficient information to
enable them to determine whether they should purchase the security.
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would be only a limited usefulness in requiring disclosure to him of information
concerning the operation and administration of the pension plan.
This articulation is similar to the one which underlies Rule 133 of the General
Rules and Regulations under the Securities Act41 which provides that, for the purpose
of section 5 of the Securities Act only, 2 a no-sale transaction shall be deemed to be
involved with respect to the shareholders of a corporation when their securities are
exchanged or modified pursuant to a reclassification, merger, consolidation or sale
of assets in exchange for stock in another corporation if the law of the state of
incorporation or the corporation's articles of incorporation authorizes the approval
of the transaction by majority vote of the shareholders and such vote binds all
shareholders of the corporation whose stockholders are voting except for the statutory
appraisal rights of dissenters. In other words, since the transaction may be forced
upon shareholders they have no chance to make individual investment choices and
no purpose is served in requiring disclosure to them of the investment oriented information which the Securities Act otherwise contemplates should be made available.
The Commission's position under Rule 133 has been criticized on the basis that
it does not give sufficient recognition to the part which individual consent plays in
the process of statutory reorganization. ' A similar criticism can be made with
respect to the Commission's view of the role individual employees may play in
influencing the operation and administration of pension plans in which they participate. If the information disclosed concerning the pension plan suggests the
existence of a question regarding the protection of the employees' interests, in many
cases pressure may be brought to bear on the employer to rectify the situation. The
disclosure required by the Securities Act not only fulfills an immediate function
of providing information which permits an investor to make an informed choice
among various investment media; but it also has the related effect of making persons
adhere to a higher standard of conduct than they might adhere to if they were not
sure that their conduct would be exposed to the harsh glare of publicity 4 Finally,
there is another ground on which the Commission's no-sale approach might be
criticized. Pension and profit-sharing plans and other fringe benefits have become an
increasingly important aspect of the total wage structure. The Commission's position regarding the usefulness of Securities Act disclosures may give insufficient weight
to the importance which retirement and other plans may have in affecting job
choices by employees.
41

17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1964).

42

Rule 133 was carefully drafted to exempt the transactions described from only the registration

provisions of the Securities Act. The Commission takes the position that such transactions remain subject
to the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881
(1934), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a- to hh-I (1958), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c-s (Supp. IV, 1963) [hereinafter
cited as Securities Exchange Act]. It is not clear whether the Commission's no-sale interpretation with
respect to pension plans has an equally limited scope.
4

'See Note, 47 CAL. L. REv. 112, 115 (1959).

"'See Cary, The Direction of Management Responsibility, 18 Bus. LAw. 29 (1962). If the offering
of interests in a pension plan need not be registered, the plan will not under present law become subject
to the periodic disclosure and reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act.
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Whatever the validity of the no-sale approach of the Commission in those situa-

tions where the employee has no individual say with respect to the investment of
part of his compensation in a pension plan, it has no validity where the employee
is completely free to choose whether or not he wishes to invest in the pension plan.
Such a situation will be common with respect to H.R. io pension plans. Here the

employee is in precisely the same position as any investor who has some money
available to place in any of a number of competing investment media. This is

precisely the kind of situation for which it was thought necessary to erect the
Securities Act. Nonetheless, the Commission takes the position that "no question
will be raised with respect to the registration of participations in a voluntary
contributory pension, profit-sharing, or similar plan that does not invest in the
securities of the employer company in an amount exceeding the company's contribution." This position was contained in letters, dated May 12, 1953, to Commerce
Clearing House, Inc. and Prentice Hall, Inc. and was reaffirmed in August i962. 5
No rationale for the Commission's no-action position regarding plans having such
voluntary, contributory features is articulated in these letters.
The position can, of course, be justified. The employer who creates the pension
plan is not in the pension plan business and for a great many employers it would
be burdensome to have to prepare a registration statement in connection with the
"rLetter dated Aug. a, 1962, from the Chief Counsel of the Division of Corporation Finance to
Commerce Clearing House, Inc. These letters are reproduced at I CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 2231.22.
The Commission has not always taken this position. Prior to 1951 companies were advised that plans
under which any contributions were invested in employer stock had to be registered, and that form S-i
was the appropriate form to use.
It should be noted that the Commission's position regarding plans which must presently be registered
applies not only to plans involving the purchase through employee contributions of employer stock but
also to certain savings plans pursuant to which the employee voluntarily leaves a portion of his wages
in a demand account with the employer who agrees to pay interest on the amounts left with him.
Such plans give the employees a creditor's claim against the employer's assets and thus involve the
issuance and sale by the employer of a security in the form of an "evidence of indebtedness" within the
meaning of § 2(1) of the Securities Act. The Commission considers that the exemption for short-term
commercial paper provided by § 3(a) (3) of the act is inapplicable to such plans. Cf. SEC Securities Act
Release No. 4412, Sept. 20, x961. Although questions had been raised by the Commission staff about
such plans prior to 1941, see 1941 Hearings 967, a no-action position was taken with respect to them
until after the adoption of Form S-8 in 1953. However, the first registration of such a plan did not
take place until x962. Such plans must also comply with the Trust Indenture Act of 1939.
It should be pointed out, however, that not all things which technically might be analyzed as
"evidences of indebtedness" are in fact considered "securities" within the meaning of the Securities Act.
For example, the Commission refused to accede to a request that it treat retail trading stamps redeemable in cash or merchandise as "evidences of indebtedness" within the meaning of § 2(I) of the
Securities Act. The Commission stated that: ". . . the same argument could be made as to streetcar
tokens, meal tickets, Christmas gift cerificates, box tops, railroad or theatre tickets, and others too
numerous to mention. The legislative history and other provisions of the statute indicate that the Congress
did not intend to include such items within the scope of the statute." SEC Securities Act Release No.
3890, Jan. 21, 1958. In addition, the Commission has taken the position that the travelers' checks issued
by the American Express Company are not securities within the meaning of § 2(I). See Leighton v.
Customers' credit balances left with
SEC, 221 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (955).
broker-dealers have not been treated as securities, whether they bear interest or not. Merchants' trade
accounts payable usually do not constitute securities. The dividing line in these areas between interests
which are securities and those which are not might be described as one between media created
primarily for exchange and media created primarily for savings or investment.
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operation of their pension plans.40 The consequences of imposing Securities Act
responsibilities upon the employer might result in causing him not to permit any
of his employees to make pension plan contributions toward their retirement.
The Commission's position that both the employer's stock and the interests in
the plan pursuant to which it is issued must be registered where the employer's
stock is the investment medium for employee contributions fits in with this rationale.
The employer, in that case, has a direct financial interest in the solicitation of the
employees' contributions and it is not unfair to make him assume the same burdens
which corporations typically assume when they go to the public for financing.47
The responsibility of the Commission to apply the protections of the Securities
Act to plans for the purchase by employees of employer stock was made clear in
1934 in the course of the adoption of the Securities Exchange Act. A provision had
been added on the floor of the Senate to the bill that became the Securities Exchange
Act, which would have amended section 4() of the Securities Act by adding the
following words:
As used in this paragraph, the term "public offering" shall not be deemed to include
an offering made solely to employees of an issuer or of its affiliates in connection with
a bona fide plan for the payment of48extra compensation or stock-investment plan for
the exclusive benefit of such employees.
The amendment was eliminated by the Conference Committee at the insistence of
the House conferees. The report of the Conference Committee said this was done
"on the ground that the participants in employees' stock investment plans may be
in as great need of the protection afforded by availability of information concerning the issuer for which they work as are most other members of the public."49
" The burdens of registration would of course be particularly great for the smaller employer and
smaller plan. Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, however, gives the Commission power to exempt plans
from the registration provisions of the act if the employees' contributions do not exceed $300,000 per
year. Many plans, including most H.R. io plans, would be able to qualify for such an exemption.
The Commission has never adopted a rule under § 3(b) of the Securities Act giving a blanket exemption
to pension plans meeting the $3oo,ooo test. The only exemption presently available to pension' plans
under § 3(b) is provided by Regulation A. On the other hand, concern for the smaller employer at the
time of the adoption of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act in1958 led to the creation of an
exemption from the act for any plan which did not cover more than 25 employees. The 1962 amend.
ments to the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act expanded on this principle by exempting plans
covering less than oo participants from the annual reporting though not the registration provisions of
the act.
"'Once it is assumed that the employer's stock is being offered to the employees and is, therefore,
subject to the registration statement requirement because of the lack of a private offering, it is not a far
(or burdensome) step to require the employer to include information about the pension plan along with
the information- concerning the stock. Form S-8, promulgated on June s6, 1953, was specially designed
to call for information with respect to both the stock and the plan.
1878 CoNG. R C. 87o8 (1934).
During the discussion on the Senate floor
'I H.R. R p. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (934).
of the Conference report, the Senator who had sponsored the §4(x) amendment regarding employee
stock investment plans was told that one of the reasons the Conference Committee struck the amendment
was that a majority of the conferees thought that offerings limited to employees could not be "public
offerings" iifany event. 78 CoNG. R c. 1o8x-82 (1934). Such a view would of course be inconsistent with the statement contained in the Conference Committee report which is quoted in the text.
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The Commission has consistently required te registration of voluntary, contributory
stock purchase plans.
Although the Commission's no-action position with respect to other voluntary
contributory plans can be justified along the lines discussed on pages 8o9 to 8io, complete understanding of the Commission's position can only be achieved in light of a
review of the efforts made in the legislative program of 1941 to deal with pension
plans. As part of that program, the Commission proposed one amendment to the
Securities Act which would have exempted from the act employee plans meeting
certain rigid conditions,5" and a second amendment which would have given the

Commission the power by rule to exempt, for purposes of section 5, interests in any
other employee "savings, pension, profit-sharing or other employees' benefit plan."'

Although the entrance of the United States into the Second World War, which
occurred during the House hearings on the Commission's program, caused the
program to be dropped without action being taken by the Congress, the reception
given to the Commission's position regarding employee plans during the House
hearings could hardly be described as enthusiastic. No industry witness appeared
to testify on behalf of the proposed amendments; but several industry witnesses
testified against them. This was not because they thought that the provisions
of the Securities Act should be applied to employee plans. On the contrary, they
said that the Securities Act had not been intended to cover any kind of employee
plan except stock purchase plans; and they argued that Congress should not adopt
the amendments because adoption would have the effect of sanctioning the Commission's construction of the act and would thus cause the act to become applicable
The Supreme Court in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. ix9 (9!3),
said in a footnote that the statement contained in the Conference report was "entitled to more weight"
than the statements made in the debate on the floor. 346 U.S. at s26 n.13.
"OThe assets had to be held in a trust specifying that the assets and income could be used only
for the exclusive benefit of the employees; the employer had to be obligated to make regular cash
contributions; 75% of the assets had to be held in cash, bonds, notes, debentures, insurance contracts,
bank stock or government securities; none of the assets could be invested in securities of the employer; the
interests of the employees relating to their own contributions had to be nonforfeitable; each participant
had to receive a summary of the plan and an annual report; a copy of the trust instrument had to be
made available to each participant upon request; and the summary of the plan and a copy of the trust
instrument and each annual report had to be filed with the Commission. z941 Hearings 9o8.
" See X94 Z Hearings at 907, 950. On the other hand, the Commission opposed a bill introduced
by Congressman Paddock which would have exempted from the definition of "security" in the Securities
Act any plan which qualified under § 165 (now § 401) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Commission
opposed the bill on two grounds. First, that the restrictions imposed by §165 were not sufficient to
justify exemption under the Securities Act for all qualified plans. (This is an"interesting position in view
of the fact that the Investment Company Act did contain an express exemption for all qualified plans
and this had apparently been acceptable to the Commission.) The second was that any exemption given
to employee plans under the Securities Act should apply only to the registration provisions of the Act:
Such plans should remain subject to the anti-fraud provisions. .941 Hearings 919-2o.
The Paddock bill would also have exempted from the definition of "security" in the Securities Act
any interest in an employee's savings account plan pursuant to which the employee voluntarily leaves part

of his wages in a demand account with the employer who guarantees principal and interest on the
amounts retained. Id. at 975-76. The Commission also opposed this exemption. See id. at 919-20.
As indicated in note 45 supra, the Commission presently requires such plans to be registered.
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to any employee plan which did not meet the terms of any exemption granted
pursuant to the amendments. Nothing said by the House Committee members
during the hearings was calculated to give the Commission much comfort about
2
applying the Securities Act to plans other than stock purchase plans.
One other reason for the Commission's reluctance to compel registration under
the Securities Act of voluntary contributory plans other than stock purchase plans
is worth mentioning. A great variety of plans and benefits exist and the lines
that can be drawn between welfare plans and pension plans, funded plans and
unfunded plans, voluntary contributory plans and compulsory or noncontributory plans, insured plans and trusteed plans, are not always very meaningful.
Opportunities for abuse can exist in any one of these types of plans. Consequently,
application of the registration provisions of the Securities Act to only one of the
many varieties of plans (i.e., to only trusteed retirement plans having a voluntary
contributory aspect) would go only a short distance toward protecting the interests
of participants in welfare and pension plans generally. Conversely, application of
the provisions of the Securities Act to one type of plan would make it difficult to
explain why other types of plans should not also be subject to the act. If all such
plans had to be registered, the Commission staff would have received a flood of
registration statements-a flood which they were not equipped to handle and for
which it would have been difficult to secure congressional appropriations.
The Commission has never embodied its present "hands-off" policy concerning
pension plans in the form of an interpretative or exemptive rule. Employers and
their plans, therefore, do not enjoy the insulation from liability which section
Ig(a) of the Securities Act gives to persons who omit to do acts in good faith in
conformity with a Commission rule. Although it can be argued that the Commission's "no-sale' interpretation in connection with noncontributory or involuntary
plans need not as a practical matter be incorporated in a rule (since it is unlikely
that a court would refuse to apply this interpretation if urged to do so by the Commission), this cannot be said with respect to the Commission's no-action position
concerning voluntary contributory plans. Thus, the possibility remains that, at least
with respect to those plans which are relying on the Commission's no-action position,
the plan and its related trust and the employer are subject to liability under section
12(1) of the Securities Act.
Section 12(l) provides that

any person who offers or sells a security without
complying with the registration and prospectus provisions of section 5 of the act can
be forced by the purchaser of the security to rescind the transaction. This liability,
however, is probably more theoretical than real in the context of the average pension
" At one point Congressman Wolverton said to Commissioner Purcell: "Well, the more you talk
*..the more I am impressed with the thought that the subject is so big, of such a character, and covers
a field so wide that it should be a matter of special legislation, if it is necessary, and not to be tacked
on to the Securities Act like a wart to something that was never intended to apply to it. It just seems
to me that you are driving something in that never was in contemplation when we passed this
Securities Act." 194z Hearings 913.
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or welfare plan. For one thing, section 13 imposes a one-year statute of limitation on
any action brought to enforce a liability under section 12(1). Thus, the employee's
rescission right in the pension or welfare plan context would only apply to any contribution made by him to the plan within the one-year period preceding the commencement of suit. The contribution made by an employee in any single year
will usually be so small that he would have little motivation to want to exercise
any rescission right he might have. Moreover, in many cases, exercise of the
rescission right might result in the employee losing benefits under the plan that are
as valuable as the recission right or even more valuable than that right.53 Further,
it is likely that few employees or pensioners would want to bring suit against their
employer or their plan.
Even though the section 12(1) liability is, therefore, largely theoretical for most
pension or employee benefit plans, it would nonetheless be desirable to eliminate it
entirely for those plans which the Commission has decided ought not to be required
to comply with section 5 of the act. There are some steps in this direction which
the Commission could take under its present statutory authority. The Commission
could, to begin with, incorporate its no-sale position in an interpretative rule under the
Securities Act. Such a rule could be adopted under either section 2(3) of the act
(in which case it would apply for all purposes under the act), or section 5 of the
act (in which case it would apply for purposes of that section only). The Commission could also adopt a rule under section 3 (b) of the act granting an unconditional
exemption from the provisions of section 5 of the act for voluntary, contributory
plans which do not invest in securities of the employer in an amount in excess of
the employer's contributions. The exemption which can be granted under section
3 (b) is limited by the present provisions of the act to plans where the employees'
contributions do not exceed $3o0,0oo annually. Thus, before the Commission's noaction position can be incorporated in a rule applicable to all voluntary contributory
plans, the act would have to be amended to remove the $3oo,ooo limitation for
securities issued by pension and other employee benefit plans. Such an amendment
is identical to the one proposed by the Commission in its 1941 legislative program. 4
Even if the above exemptions were granted with respect to the liability imposed
by section 12(1) of the Securities Act, possible liability would, nonetheless, remain
under the anti-fraud provisions of sections i2(z) and 17 of the Securities Act and
section io of the Securities Exchange Act. The employer (or other plan sponsor
such as a union), as a controlling person55 or underwriter or seller, and the plan
and its related trust, if any, as an issuer, would be liable under these sections if they
"' The effect of an employee's attempt to rescind is by no means clear. For example, in a case
involving medical or death benefits can an employee rescind after he has enjoyed coverage for the year?
Where the plan provides for matching employer contributions, will the employee's rescission permit the
employer to take back his contribution-or, if the employer cannot take back his contribution, will
the benefit to the employee attributable to the employer's contribution nonetheless be lost to him?
'See p. 81r supra.
Securities Act § 15; Securities Exchange Act § 2o(a), (b).
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were responsible for any untrue or misleading statement made in connection with
an "offer" or "sale" (for purposes of these sections) of any interest in the plan
which constitutes a "security." Since these and-fraud provisions do not impose an
undue burden on anyone, there is no reason why they should not remain as
remedies available to employees for use in cases where fraud of the kind covered
by these sections has been committed.
A. Investment Company Act Considerations
Perhaps, since a large portion of the contributions made by and on behalf of
employees are not voluntary and therefore permit the employees no effective choice
with respect to their disposition, the disclosure protections of the Securities Act are
not so vital for the protection of employee participants in benefit plans. However,
the protections of the Investment Company Act would appear peculiarly appropriate
in this situation. The participants in a benefit plan are normally locked into their
investment to a much greater extent than the ordinary holder of mutual fund shares.
Thus, those provisions of the act which give investment company shareholders some
voice in the management of the company's assets, provide for one or more persons to
act as a watchdog of the shareholders' interest, and spell out certain substantive
rules which require the investment company's affairs to be managed solely in the
interests of the shareholders seem to be of special significance to such participants.
However, the value of the Investment Company Act in this area has never really
been tested. Fewer than twenty employee plans have been registered under the
act. 6 The small number of registrations is not due to any doubt that a pension
or other employee benefit trust which invests in securities fits the basic definition of
an investment company. It is an issuer which is engaged primarily in the business
of "investing, reinvesting or trading in securities."5 However, most pension trusts
"oMany of the plans which have registered have been plans for investment in the employer company's
stock.
" Investment Company Act § 3(a) (z). Whether the Commission would consider that a trust which
is empowered to invest only in insurance contracts issued by insurance companies is an investment
company for purposes of the Investment Company Act is not clear. It seems likely, however, that the
Commission would hold that such insurance contracts do not constitute securities (see the discussion
supra note 33) for purposes of the Investment Company Act and that the trust does not constitute an
investment company. In addition to the definition of investment company which is contained in
§ 3(a) (i) of the act and quoted in the text above, § 3(a) (2) of the act contains a second definition of an
investment company. It states that an investment company includes any company which engages in the

business of issuing face-amount certificates of the installment type. Although the employee's interest
in a pension or welfare plan may arguably sometimes fit the language which is used in § 2(a) (x5) of the
Investment Company Act to define a face-amount certificate of the installment type, the definition was
not written with such benefits iv mind and the Commission is unlikely to determine that such benefits
come within the meaning of the definition.
An employee benefit plan which invests solely in government bonds which qualify as exempted

securities under the Securities Act would constitute an investment company under the first definition of
an investment company mentioned above. Such bonds are clearly securities. However, a trust which
invests primarily in notes secured by mortgages would be able to qualify for the exemption contained in
section 3(c)(6)(C) of the Investment Company Act. Aside from pension plans, employee welfare plans
funded with securities would also appear to be investment companies. Welfare plans would not qualify
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have been exempted from complying with the provisions of the Investment Company
Act by section 3(c) (13) which exempts from the definition of investment company
"any employees' stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing trust which meets the condi-

tions of section 165 of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended." This exemption
was not contained in the original draft of the Investment Company Act, but appeared
for the first time in the final version of the act. The legislative history does not
indicate the reasons for including this exemption.58 However, the "conditions of
section 165" (now section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code) assure some protection
to participants in pension trusts. In order to meet the conditions, the pension trust
must be established for the exclusive benefit of the participants and no part of its
assets may be used by or revert to the employer. In addition, section 503(c) of the
Code prohibits certain transactions between the pension trust and any person, such
as the employer, who has made a substantial contribution to the trust. Since the
employer is prevented by section 401 from benefiting from the administration and
operation of the pension trust, and since it can be assumed that he is interested in
assuring that his contributions to the plan provide a maximum amount of benefit to
his employees, the danger of the trust being administered in a way which disregards
the interests of the employees is minimized. This would be particularly true with
respect to those pension trusts which provide fixed benefits since the employer in
those situations would have an added incentive to keep his costs down by seeking
the most efficient administration of the trust. As a result imposing the protections
of the Investment Company Act may not provide sufficient additional benefits to
justify the cost of requiring compliance with the act. The reluctance to impose the
cost of compliance with the Investment Company Act on a person who is not in the
securities business, but who has decided to create a pension or other benefit plan for
his employees, is reflected by section 6(b) of the act which specifically provides that
the Commission shall grant an exemption from the act to any employees' security
company "if and to the extent that such exemption is consistent with the protection
of investors."59 The Commission has granted exemptions to approximately twenty
companies under this provision. Almost all of the exemptions which have been
granted have related to certain specific sections of the act: The Commission has preferred to avoid granting blanket exemptions from all of the provisions of the act. The
for the exemption contained in section 3(c)(13) of the Investment Company Act. However, no welfare
plans have been registered under the Investment Company Act.
It should be noted that funded plans can become subject to the Investment Company Act even if they
do not contain a voluntary contributory element. No "sale" or public "offer" is necessary in order to
bring the act into play.
"The original draft of the act did contain the provisions of the present section 6(b) allowing
the Commission to grant exemptions for "employees' securities companies."
"5 Section 6(b) of the act uses the mandatory word "shall," as distinquished from the permissive
"may" which is used in § 6(c). Section 6(d) of the act also uses the word "shall." Compare the
description of § 6(b) by SEC counsel David Schenker in the Senate hearings on' the act, Hearings on
S. 358o Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 7 6th Cong., 2d Sess.
r96-97 (940), with the statement made in In the Matter of Executives Investment Trusts-Elfulf Trusts,
14 S.E.C. 826, 829 n.12 (1943).
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exemptions have been granted on the basis of an ad hoc determination in each case

and the Commission has not always clearly articulated the standards which it has
applied in granting and refusing exemptions requested by such companies.00
B. The Federal Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act
The hands-off policy of the Commission and the limited applicability of the
federal securities laws to the many varieties of welfare and pension plans left such
plans largely unaffected by any disclosure or regulatory legislation at the federal level
which was designed to protect employee interests. 1 As the importance of welfare
and pension plans grew during and after World War II it was perhaps not surprising that some abuses regarding such plans developed. Beginning in 1954 a
Senate subcommittee, at the suggestion of President Eisenhower, undertook the first

of a series of investigations of welfare and pension plans. These uncovered various
abuses-primarily related to welfare plans and to practices surrounding the use of
insurance. The investigations culminated in the adoption in 1958 of the Federal
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act.
Initially the Senate subcommittee recommended that the Securities and Exchange
Commission administer the act because "of its organizational set up and its established success in the administration of disclosure type statutes.""2 The Commission
was not enthusiastic about undertaking this new task. It felt that the plans subject
to the act were inseparably intertwined with labor management relations and that
the abuses uncovered had their main effect not in the capital market but upon
economic areas in which the Commission did not possess expertise. In addition, the
Commission was also worried about the number of plans which would be
registered under the act.' On the other hand, the Department of Labor asked for
the authority to administer the act, and was supported in this request by the Eisenhower Administration.' It ultimately received that power.
The Federal Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act as initially passed by the
Senate was primarily a disclosure statute but it contained certain minimal regulatory
provisions and gave limited administrative powers to the Department of Labor.
As finally passed by the Congress in 1958, however, the act was considerably watered
down. The regulatory provisions and the administrative powers of the Department
6oThe Commission has issued opinions with respect to only four of the applications for exemption
which have been filed under § 6(b): In the Matter of Electrical Securities Corp., 1o S.E.C. 648 (1941);
In the Matter of G.E. Employees Securities Corp., so S.E.C. 652 (x941); In the Matter of Executives
Investment Trusts-Elfun Trusts, 14 S.E.C. 8a6 (1943); In the Matter of The Thrift Plan of Tenness-e
Gas and Transmission CO., 24 S.E.C. 241 (1946). Cf. In the Matter of Maritime Corporation, supra
note 32.

a'Several states have passed statutes similar to the Federal Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act.

These statutes will not be discussed in this article.
S. REP. No. 1734, 84 th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1956).
05

Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Welfare and Pension Plans Legislation of the Senate Com-

mittee on Labor and Public Welfare, 8 5 th Cong., ist Sess. xi9 (1957).

At least one commissioner, Earl F. Hastings, thought that the potential impact of pension plans on
the capital marliet perhaps justified Commission oversight. Id. at izo.
" Id.at 83.
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of Labor were reduced or eliminated. This more limited act did not satisfy Secre-

tary of Labor Mitchell or President Eisenhower. In signing the act into law, President Eisenhower said he was approving it "because it establishes a precedent of
federal responsibility in this area. It does little else .... If the bill is to be at all
effective, it will require extensive amendment at the next session of Congress." '
The act was in fact amended in 1962 and now contains most of the provisions which
had been recommended by the Senate but had been left out of the act as adopted in
1958.
The Federal Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act remains essentially a
disclosure rather than a regulatory statute. The disclosures which it requires concerning pension plans, however, are not in some respects as complete or as readily
available to the employees as those which could be required under the federal securities laws. On the other hand, since the disclosure and regulatory provisions of the
act have been designed specifically for pension and welfare plans they call for more
information in some areas and are in many respects more appropriate for such
plans than the provisions of the federal securities laws.
Section 6 of the act requires that a "description" of any employee welfare or
pension benefit plan shall be "published." The description must include a copy
of the instrument pursuant to which the plan was established and is operated.6
In addition, it must include a description of selected items such as a schedule of
benefits to be paid under the plan, the source of the financing and the identity of
any organization through which benefits are provided, and the procedures to be
followed in presenting claims for benefits and the remedies available under the plan
for the redress of claims denied in whole or in part. Section 7 of the act provides
for the "publishing" of an annual report. The basic items contained in this report
are a description (for the period covered by the report) of the amount contributed
to the plan by the employer, the amount contributed to the plan by the employees,
and the amount of the benefits paid and the employees covered; a detailed statement
of the assets in the plan at the reporting date, "specifying the total amount in each
of the following types of assets: cash, Government bonds, non-Government bonds
and debentures, common stocks, preferred stocks, common trust funds, real estate
loans and mortgages, operated real estate, other real estate, and other assets"; 67 a
statement of the liabilities of the plan; a statement (for the period covered by the
report) of the receipts and disbursements of the plan and of the amount of salaries,
fees and commissions charged to the plan, to whom and for what purposes they
" See H.R. REP. No. 998, 87th Cong., ist Sess. 2 (196r).
" This requirement is similar to that imposed by Treasury Regulation" § I.40T-I(b) for qualified
pension plans.
"'The Special Study of Securities Markets recently recommended that the Federal Welfare and
Pension Plans Disclosure Act be amended to require pension funds to disclose their holdings of corporate
securities by listing each issue rather than just showing the aggregate amount of their holdings in terms
of the general categories presently required by the act. Securities and Exchange Commission, Special
Study of Securities Marikets, H. Doc. No. 95, pt. 2, 88th Cong., ist Sess. 870 (1963).
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were paid; and the type and basis of funding and actuarial assumptions used and
the amount of the current and past service liabilities under the plan. The information required in the annual report does not seem to give the participants in the plan
a basis upon which to evaluate the investment performance of the plan in those cases
where the benefits are variable.
The extent to which the administrator"8 of the plan must make either the description of the plan or the annual report available to the participants is determined by
the requirement that each of these documents be "published." Publication is defined
in section 8 of the act. It means that two copies of the plan and the annual report
must be filed with the Secretary of Labor who, in turn, makes them available for
inspection by the public. In addition, it also means that the administrator of the
plan must make copies of the description of the plan and the annual report available
for examination by any participant in the plan at the principal office of the plan;
and that any participant who makes a request in writing must be sent a copy of the
description of the plan and an adequate summary of the latest annual report. Under
the Federal Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, the participant must take
the initiative if he is going to get the information to which the act says he is entitled.
However, under the federal securities laws a duty is imposed on the distributors
of a security to see that the purchaser receives the information which those laws say
he ought to have.
In addition to these disclosure provisions, provisions were added by the 1962
amendments to the act which: give the Department of Labor investigatory and
enforcement powers and the power to issue regulations; impose record-keeping and
retention requirements upon plan administrators; require plan administrators and
plan employees who handle property of the plan to be bonded in order to protect

the plan against loss by reason of their fraud or dishonesty; 9 and impose criminal
penalties for embezzlement, theft or conversion of plan assets, for making false
statements or concealing facts in connection with the disclosure provisions of the

act, and for offering or accepting kickbacks or bribes in connection with the plan.
The act excludes from its provisions all plans having not more than twenty-five
participants and in addition provides that plans having less than ioo participants
shall in general be exempt from the annual reporting requirements of the act. No
similar automatic exclusions are contained in the federal securities laws.10
08 The term administrator is defined in § 5(b) of the act as meaning: "(x) the person or persons
designated by the terms of the plan or the collective bargaining agreement with responsibility for the
ultimate control, disposition, or management of the money received or contributed; or (a) in the absence
of such designation, the person or persons actually responsible for the control, disposition, or managemerit of the money received or contributed, irrespective of whether such control, disposition, or management is exercised directly or through an agent or trustee designated by such person or persons."
o The regulations under the act provide that the bonding requirements shall not apply to banks
when acting as trustees for the plans of other employers or to insurance carriers providing benefits under

a plan.

29 C.F.R. § 1306.4(e) (1963).

" Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act excludes from the definition of investment company any issuer whose outstanding securities ate owned by less than too persons if the issuer is not
making and does not propose to make a public offering of its securities.
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One point of particular interest for present purposes is the fact that the Federal
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act has not in general been considered
applicable to commingled funds which are used as the funding medium for commingling the assets of two or more separate employee plans. The act is designed
to apply at the level of the individual pension or welfare plan-not at the level of
the investment medium which may be used to fund the plan. Thus, where an
employee pension plan has been funded through a participation in a bank commingled fund, the act simply requires the annual report of the plan to show the
amount of its investment in the commingled fund under the general category
"common trust funds" 7 --just as an investment by the plan directly in investment
company shares or individual stocks would be shown under the general categories
"common stocks" or "preferred stocks." The extent to which the Department of
Labor will extend this same treatment to all of the various kinds of H.R. io arrangements has not as of the time of this writing, however, been finally determined. The
Department presently has under consideration the question whether certain association or other prototype H.R. io plan arrangements might make the sponsor the
"administrator" of the plan, in which case the act would apply at the level of the
prototype plan as distinguished from the level of the individual employer.

IV

THE

COMMINGLED FuND

Two of the prime factors in the unwillingness to apply the federal securities laws
to protect the interests of participants in pension plans were that to a great extent

these participants did not appear to be true investors and that the employer who
created the pension plan was not in the pension plan business and that it would,
therefore, be inappropriate to saddle him with the costs of complying with the
provisions of the federal securities laws. Neither of these factors appears to be
relevant in considering whether the federal securities laws should be applied to a
commingled fund in which the assets of several pension plans may be invested.
In the H.R. io situation, for example, the employer, like any other investor, has
a choice of funding the assets of the plan in any number of investment media. If he
has determined on an equity investment, he can choose a bank-sponsored commingled fund, a mutual fund, or a variable annuity. If he decides on a bank commingled fund, he can choose one sponsored by the Chase Manhattan Bank, the First
National City Bank of New York, or the Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company.
The creator of the commingled fund, unlike the employer who establishes a pension
plan, is in the business of operating such funds. It does not seem inappropriate to
impose on him the duty of complying with the provisions of the federal securities
laws-particularly when his competitors must do so.
71 See

§ 7(b) of the act and item 4 of Exhibit B-i to the form D-2 which has been issued under the
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Despite these considerations, the Commission has not, prior to its H.R. iOposition,
required the registration of interests in a bank-sponsored commingled fund when
the fund is used as an investment medium solely by employee pension plans which
meet the qualifications of section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code. The Commission's position was developed primarily in the context of the use by banks of
commingled funds as a way of managing the investment of pension trust assets
which were too small to be managed separately. The premise of the Commission's
position is that the transactions in which the assets of these pension trusts are invested in the bank commingled funds are exempt under section 4() of the Securities'
Act from section 5 of the act because they do not involve a public offering.72 There
would seem to be two ways to support this premise. First, since the trustee of the
commingled fund and each pension trust is the same person (the bank), nothing
would be gained by requiring disclosure. In those situations where the bank is only
one of a number of trustees of the pension trust, the bank's fiduciary duty probably
requires it to transmit to its co-trustees all the information concerning the commingled fund which they would need in order to determine whether or not the
commingled fund is a suitable investment medium for the pension trust. This
argument, however, would seem to collapse if the arrangement made with the bank
contemplates that the trust assets (or a certain portion of them) will be invested
in a particular commingled fund. In that case, the employer, in effect, makes the
investment decision. The second support for the private offering exemption is built
on the assumption that the employer who creates the pension trust will be able to
fend for himself 7 3 It is assumed that he will set up the pension trust with the aid
of a lawyer, accountant and actuary-all of whom presumably are experienced in the
area of pension plans and know whether or not the investment medium offered by
the particular bank's commingled fund is satisfactory in relation to the investment
media provided by other institutions. At a minimum, such employers are thought
to be sufficiently sophisticated (and important) to request (and obtain) any information which they think is necessary to an intelligent investment choice. These
assumptions may be consonant with the facts in many cases; but they are not in every
case.
Although the Commission's extension of the private offering concept to all the
transactions in which the assets of employee pension plans are invested in bank
commingled funds used solely for that purpose seems logically unsound, its desire
not to assume responsibility with respect to such transactions is understandable when
viewed in the context of the Commission's early experience with the pension plan
area. As pointed out previously" 4 there was doubt about the power (and more
clearly the desirability) of the Commission exercising any jurisdiction with respect
to pension or other employee benefit plans which did not involve the purchase by
'2 See Memorandum re Securities Act Release No. 4552, repriated in Fascell Hearing 167-68.
2
S5ee Securities and Exchange Commission v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. xig (1953).
".See pp. 8x-12 supra.
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employees of securities in the employer company. In addition, when the Securities
Act was enacted, bank trusteed pension plans were small in number. The pension
trusts of huge corporations such as U.S. Steel Corporation, General Motors Corporation, and American Telephone and Telegraph Company dominated the pension plan
world. The assets of these large plans were individually trusteed and were not
invested in bank commingled funds. The small, unsophisticated employer rarely
seemed to have a trusteed pension plan. Thus, the presence of the type of investor
and investment situation for which the protections of the federal securities laws were
enacted seemed to be lacking.
The period of rapid growth of pension plans did not occur until late in the i94os.
Bank efforts to share in such growth did not appear to be marked by newspaper or
other advertisements which stressed the investment media provided by the banks.
These advertisements concentrated on the fiduciary services generally offered by
banks. The pension plan business, thus, appeared to have all the earmarks of the
type of personal trust business which appeared to be excluded from the operation
of the federal securities laws. The absence of any scandals surrounding the operation of the bank commingled funds probably confirmed the Commission's suspicion
that its energies and limited resources could be more fruitfully spent elsewhere.
As was the case with respect to voluntary employee contributions to pension plans,
the Commission has never articulated its position regarding bank commingled funds
in the form of a rule-in this case a rule interpreting section 4(1) of the Securities
Act. On the other hand, in late 1963 the Commission adopted Rule 15676 which
defines the private offering exemption of section 4(I) to include the sale, under
certain circumstances, of separate account group annuity contracts by insurance
companies to employers. One of the circumstances required to make the exemption
effective is that the employer must have at least twenty-five employees at the time
the contract is executed. This requirement may be a sufficient indication that the
employer will be able to fend for himself when he negotiates such a separate account
group annuity contract. However, no such requirement could be written into a
rule designed to protect all existing bank commingled funds from the absolute
liability imposed by section 12(1) of the Securities Act because many such funds
have permitted the commingling of assets of pension plans covering fewer than
twenty-five employees-indeed, some participating plans apparently cover only
' S. RaP. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1956) sums up the reasons for the great growth of pension
plans as follows:

"(x) High corporation taxes during and since World War II, coupled with the allowance of tax
deductions for contributions to these programs, thus permitting their establishment at a low net cost.
"(2) Wage stabilization programs during and since World War II and the Korean conflict, which froze
wage rates but permitted increased employee compensation in the form of these 'fringe' benefits.
"(3) Court decisions in the years 1948-50 which made welfare and pension matters a bargainable
issue.
"(4) Since 1948, the drive of labor unions to obtain welfare and pension programs. Labor spokesmen
state that another reason for the development of these programs has been the inadequacy of benefits under
the governmental programs."
70 17 C.F.R. § 23o.i56 (1964).
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one or two employees. Drawing the rule without reference to some standard
which has a reasonable relationship to the ability of the investing employer to fend
for himself would appear to be beyond the statutory power of the Commission.
Absent a rule there is always the possibility that the bank operating the commingled
fund may be subject to absolute liability for having sold a security in violation of
the registration requirements of section 5 of the Securities Act. The Commission
has no power under the Securities Act to exempt such commingled funds from
the registration provisions of the act

7

What was it which caused the Commission to refuse to extend its no-action
position to the H.R. Io commingled fund? Different Securities Act treatment of
H.R. io plans as opposed to employee pension plans cannot be justified on the
grounds that in the former case an individual rather than a corporation may create
the plan or that in the former employers as well as employees may be covered. The
reason for the Commission's position seems related to the fact that for the vast
majority of H.R. xo plans it appeared as if the investing employers would be no
more able to fend for themselves than the usual purchaser of securities for whose
benefit the registration and prospectus requirements of the Securities Act were
developed.!' Moreover, as pointed out above, it was apparent that a commingled
fund could be profitably operated only if a large number of individual H.R. xo
accounts were created with the bank. This factor presaged an aggressive merchandising campaign-and the advertisement of the Chase Manhattan Bank seemed
to confirm that supposition. Further, the size of the typical H.R. io account suggested that the personalized service which the banks claimed was a hallmark of
their trust business would be omitted or have to be severely curtailed. This thought
appeared to be echoed in a speech at the Mid-Winter Trust Conference of the
American Bankers Association held in New York in early February 1963. The
speaker, G. T. Lumpkin, a Vice President of the Wachovia Bank and Trust Company of Winston-Salem, North Carolina, said:
This [H.R. io business] is a dramatic change in the nature of trust business. We

must meet it with a mind open to possible dramatic change in approach. Rather than
the close personal basis on which other types of trust service have been handled, we must

look toward an assembly line approach, a semi-automated approach, or even possibly a
fully automated approach. Rather than a daily, weekly, or monthly personal contact with

a trust customer, we must look to an indirect yearly contact, in many cases through an
annual statement mailed to his home or business address. Rather than a trust customer

judging us on his intimate knowledge of our service to him to fill his personal needs, he
will be judging us strictly on the investment return he receives. Rather than a man-to-man
relationship, we must consider a machine-to-man concept of fiduciary service.1 9
" The Securities Act does not have any provision comparable to the broad exemptive power granted
the Commission by § 6(c) of the Investment Company Act.
" One banker estimated that H.R. zo created i9 million new trust prospects. A Fork in the Road,
address by G. T. Lumpkin, Jr., 4 4th Mid-Winter Trust Conference of the American Bankers Ass'n, Feb. 5,
x963, in Fascell Hearing 114-20.
'lid. at 114.
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Whereas employee pension plans had at first grown slowly, with large corporate
employers in the forefront and business procedures in many ways identical to those
utilized in the banks' traditional trust business, H.R. io seemed to require rapid
growth, the involvement of all segments of the public and many dramatic departures
from the trust business in directions normally associated with the securities business.
There are essentially three types of equity investment media in which H.R. io
trusts can be invested: mutual funds, variable annuity contracts, and bank-sponsored
commingled funds!' The Commission's position that the interests in each of these
media had to be registered under the Securities Act had a different impact on each
group of sponsors. For the mutual funds, whose shares were already registered,
little change in existing procedures has so far been required."' Typically, a short
statement has been included in the prospectus announcing the availability of a plan
pursuant to which the mutual fund shares could be used as the investment medium
for an H.R. io trust, stating the name of the custodian bank, and setting forth the
82
charges.
Although the insurance companies had bitterly protested"3 the Commission's
efforts to force their variable annuity funds to comply with the provisions of the
Investment Company Act, the same resistance was not made in connection with the
registration requirement under the Securities Act for interests in an annuity fund
created solely as an investment medium for assets of H.R. 1o plans. Indeed, during
the time that it was litigating the applicability of the Investment Company Act to
its variable annuity fund, the Prudential Insurance Company of America filed a
"One variety of the bank sponsored commingled fund is a fund sponsored by an association, such as
the American Bar Retirement Association which has been set up for use exclusively by the members of its
affiliate, the American Bar Association.
" Although the offering of interests through a master plan pursuant to which mutual fund shares
are used as the investment medium for H.R. 1o plans and pursuant to which the shares are held in a
custodian account with a designated bank may be considered to involve the offering of a registrable
security, the Commission has not required their registration.
82 The prospectus for Massachusetts Investors Trust, dated March i8, 1963, revised as of May 27,
1963, contains the following statement:
"For those self-employed individuals who wish to purchase shares of the Trust in conjunction with the
Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, there is available through the underwriter a
Custody Agreement and Plan. The Custody Agreement provides that the New England Merchants
National Bank of Boston, Massachusetts furnishes custodial services as required by such Act, for service
fees chargeable to the self-employed individual not to exceed the following amounts: opening the
custodial account, $5.oo; annual maintenance of the account, $2.oo. Additionally, there will be an annual
charge of not to exceed $6.oo per employee, plus Si.oo for each contribution' credited to each employee's

account.
"On distribution, termination or retirement there will be a charge to the participant not to exceed
the following amounts: for single distribution of cash, shares, annuity policy, government bontis, or
return of excess contribution, $7.00; for periodic cash distributions, each, $2.oo.
"For further details, including the right to appoint a successor custodian, see the Custody Agreement
and Plan as provided by the underwriter."
"3 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65
(1959); In the Matter of the Prudential Ins. Co. of America, SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 362o,
Jan. 23, 1963, aff'd sub nom., Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. SEC, 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. x964),
cert. denied, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 346 (U.S. June I, 1964); Securities and Exchange Commission v. United
Benefit Life Ins. Co., Civ. No. 3096-62, D.D.C. (filed Oct. i, x962).
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registration statement for its group variable retirement annuity contracts for H.R.
io plansP4
The principal objectors to the Commission's position were the banks and the

Comptroller of the Currency. 85 The banks saw a number of difficulties in the Commission's position. If they registered the interests in their commingled funds
they would be admitting (a) that the operation of such funds involved the issuance
of a security, and (b) that such security was being publicly offeredps Such an admission could be construed as an admission that the banks were violating those
provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act 7 which attempted to divorce commercial
banking from the securities business88 Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act" provides
that a bank may not be "engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling,
or distributing, at wholesale or retail . . . stocks ... or other securities. . . ." If the
bank commingled funds were considered to be issuing securities, then the bank
would arguably be engaged in the business of issuing or at least underwriting such
securities. However, the existence of a security for the purpose of the Securities Act
does not necessarily result in the existence of a security for Glass-Steagall Act pur-

poses.0
4

A number of examples bear that out. In Securities and Exchange Corn-

Not all insurance companies take the position that the Commission may require registration of the
interests in their variable annuity contracts under the Securities Act. This point is at issue in Securities
and Exchange Commission v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., supra note 83.
"The Comptroller of the Currency urged national banks not to register their funds under the
Securities Act and offered assistance in court if any of them were sued for failure to register them.
See statement of James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency, reprinted in Fascell Hearing x62.64.
Nevertheless one bank, National Bank of Detroit, has registered its H.R. so commingled funds. In
addition, a number of bank commingled funds which are used as the investment medium for H.R.
so plans sponsored by an association have been registered. These include the American Bar Retirement
Association Retirement Plan, the American Medical Association Members Retirement Plan, the National
Council of Salesmen's Organizations, Inc. retirement plan, and the Salesmen's Self-Employed Retirement
& Thrift Plans, Inc. retirement plan. The Commission takes the position that the organization sponsoring
these plans is the issuer.
"8 During the questioning after his statement before the Legal and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee
of the House Committee on Government Operations [hereinafter referred to as the Fascell Committee], the
Comptroller appeared to admit that the operation of an H.R. so program might involve the issuance of a
security and that under certain circumstances such security would have to be registered in compliance
with the provisions of the Securities Act.
"MR. MATAN: Mr. Saxon, if an advertisement did exceed the requirements imposed in regulation
9 [issued by the Office of the Comptroller], I understand it to be your view that there could be a violation
of the securities laws perhaps warranting the intervention of the SEC.
MR. SAXON: I think this puts it precisely correct [sic], Mr. Matan. As long as a bank strictly
complies with the requirements of this regulation, in our opinion there can be no reasonable question of
the applicability of the SEC laws. If it should step outside in a given case, then the question could
well arise, yes, sir." Fascell Hearing 49-50.
8"Banking
Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
88 See Bliss, Eliminating H.R. so Road Blocks, 102' Thusrs AND EsTArEs 96, 97-98 (1963).
89 48 Stat. 189 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1958), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 378 (Supp. IV,

1963).
9°The Glass-Steagall Act became law x9 days after the Securities Act. Thus, it may be argued
that since an important purpose of the Glass-Steagall Act was to effect a separation of the banking and
securities business and since the operation of a commingled fund (at least for bona fide fiduciary trusts)
was considered to be a proper banking function, it is reasonable to suppose that such a function
cannot involve the issuance of a security within the meaning of either statute.

PENSION AND PROFIT-SHARING PLANS

mission v. Guild Films Co.,19 the Second Circuit indicated that a bank acts as an
underwriter within the meaning of the Securities Act when it makes a public sale
of control stock or restricted stock which had been pledged to it as collateral for a
loan. This decision has apparently not been construed to mean that a bank making a
sale of stock under such circumstances violates the Glass-Steagall Act. A somewhat
similar problem has also arisen in connection with the registration of American
depository receipts issued by banks02 In that case it could be argued that the bank
is an underwriter of such receipts for the purposes of the Securities Act. In addition,
banks have sponsored registered investment companies which sell shares to participating banks.1 3 Finally, the Comptroller of the Currency has specifically authorized
the use of bank commingled funds to serve as an investment medium for H.R. IO
plans, and it cannot be lightly presumed that he would authorize activity proscribed
4
by the Glass-Steagall Act.
However large the technical hurdles under the Glass-Steagall Act may have loomed
in the eyes of the banking community, greater difficulty may have been foreseen
in terms of the impact such an admission would have on the broad questions which
were being hody debated concerning the entry of the banks into certain aspects of
the securities business. One area involved the
contemplated merchandising of interests in ... collective investment funds as investment
media [which], whether in the form of a trust or in the form of a managing agency
account, as apparently would be permitted under the proposed revisions of Regulation 9,
would place national banks squarely in the conventional investment company business. 95
Although the Commission took no position with respect to either the ability under
the Glass-Steagall Act or the desirability of the banks to engage in such activities,
others did. The Investment Company Institute, for example, suggested that such
activities posed "possible dangers to the integrity of the banking system" and questioned the legality of such operations under existing lawY6 Another area involved
an amendment in September 1963 to the Comptroller of the Currency's Investment
Securities Regulation which authorized national banks to underwrite revenue bonds
of state and local governments0 7 The Chairman of the Board of Governors of
F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub noma., Santa Monica Bank v. SEC, 364 U.S. 819 (196o).
A brief description of the American depository receipt and the various ways in" which it is used
is contained in a Louis Loss, SactrrEs REGULATION 463-65 (2d ed. g6i).
" The Bank Fiduciary Fund was organized by New York state banks. As of April 30, 1963, it had
51 participating banks and assets of not quite Sz 5 million. Its adviser is the Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Company.
" The Comptroller of the Currency's determination that the operation of such commingled funds is
not proscribed by the Glass-Steagall Act is presumably made without reference to the consequences of such
activity under the Securities Act.
" Letter From William L. Cary to Reese H. Harris, March 7, 1963, in SEC Securities Act Release No.
4589, March 11, 1963.
" Memorandum on Behalf of Investment Company Institute in Opposition to Proposal to Exempt
Collective Investment Funds Operated by Banks From the Federal Securities Laws, pp. :4-40. This memorandum was submitted in opposition to a proposed Bank Collective Investment Fund Act of 1963, S. 2223.
H.R. 8499, H.R. 9410, 88th Cong., ist Sess. (x963). For a discussion of these bills see pp. 831-33 infra.
07 28 Fed. Reg. 9916 (x963).
92 279
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the Federal Reserve System and the Investment Bankers Association of America
protested that since such bonds were not "general obligations" of a state or political8
subdivision, they fell outside the permissible area of bank underwriting activityY
The banks may also have been afraid that if they admitted that the operation
of an H.R. io commingled fund involved the public offering of a security that
it would be difficult to deny that the operation of commingled funds used to fund the
assets of employee pension plans also involved the public offering of a security. 0
However, it may be that the banks could have seized on the Commission direction
to register their H.R. io commingled funds as a device for insulating these funds
and their employee pension commingled funds from the absolute liability which is
imposed by section 12(1) on the sale of unregistered securities. The banks might
have invested the assets of the H.R. io trusts in the fund used to pool employee
pension trust assets and then registered the fund under protest-thus preserving the
arguments with respect to the non-applicability of the Securities Act.Y00 At the same
time, the one-year statute of limitations with respect to section 12(i) liability would
be running on all interests in employee pension plan commingled funds sold prior
to registration.
Perhaps the major objection which the banks raised to the Commission's assertion
of jurisdiction over the operation of their commingled funds was an unwillingness
to be subjected to what they termed the "visitorial power" of still another federal
agency. This feeling is dearly expressed in the testimony of the Comptroller of the
Currency during hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on the Commission's proposed amendments to the Securities
Exchange Act which would make certain provisions of that act applicable to bank
securities. The Comptroller was asked whether, if Congress decided to apply these
provisions to banks, he would consider it preferable to do so by amendment of the
Banking Act rather than the Securities Exchange Act. The Comptroller replied:
Yes, sir, by amendment to the appropriate banking acts and not to the SEC act.
I would hate to see any tie-in with the SEC statutes as such or policies or regulations,
whether by amendment to that act, by any delegation from that act, vesting from that
act, or otherwise. 10 1
The banks felt that they were "closely, intimately, intensively regulated institutions"
and that any further regulation would be both superfluous and burdensome. 102
8

The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 25, 1963, p. 59, col 3, p. 67, cots. 35; N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 963,
P. 37, cols. I-a, p. 38, coL. 499 See Fascell Hearing 86 (testimony of Charles W. Buck, President, United States Trust Co., New

York).

"'0 There would be no insulation from liability if such interests were sold as a result of false or misleading selling practices. Securities Act 517(a); Securities Exchange Act § io(b). The same liability
applies if the Commission's position concerning the existence of a private offering exemption is correct.
Such an exemption applies only to the provisions of S 5 of the Securities Act. In addition, registration
of this fund would not eliminate any Securities Act problems which might worry the banks with
respect to the operation of their common trust funds.
"'1 Hearings on S. x642 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee an Banking Currency,
88th Cong., ist Sess. 181 (1963).
102 FasCell Hearing 44.
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The exemption of bank securities from the definition of security in section
3(a) (2) of the Securities Act can be pointed to as demonstrating a congressional
determination that adequate supervision over the issuance of bank securities was
exercised by the appropriate banking authorities and that, therefore, the protections
of the Securities Act did not have to be extended to investors in such securities. The
Comptroller argued that supervision over the trust activities of banks was more
rigorous than any other bank activity. He said:
There is no more carefully devised or restrictive set of laws or regulations in any field
of banking, in my opinion, than that appertaining to the law of trusts, because of the
special and traditional significance attached to the fiduciary relationship and existing for
103
centuries, both in the common law and the statute law of this country.
Consequently, if any securities were issued by such trusts they, at least as much as
any bank issued security, should be exempt from the definition of securities under
the Securities Act.' 0 4
A strikingly similar argument occurred during the Senate hearings on the Commission's proposal to extend to investors in over-the-counter securities (including
bank securities) the protections of sections 12, 13, 14 and 16 of the Securities Exchange Act. The proposal provided that the powers, functions and duties of the
Commission with respect to bank securities would be delegated to the appropriate
5
The Comptroller argued
federal bank regulatory authority upon its request.'0
holders of bank securities
to
protections
investor
these
of
extension
that the proposed
was unnecessary. He pointed to the pervasive quality of bank regulation:
While it is obvious that we consider disclosure of great importance, we regard direct
supervision of banks of greater value. The combination of these two forms of public
103 ibid.
04
' The Comptroller's position does not reflect the view of all bank regulators.

For example, James
L. Robertson, a governor of the Federal Reserve Board, said at the Senate hearing on the confirmation of
his appointment that the Commission should exercise jurisdiction over H.R. io commingled funds:
"SENATOR DOMINICK. We are having problems and have been for some time on the question
of whether the Comptroller of the Currency or the Securities and Exchange Commission has jurisdiction over common trust funds and so-called Smathers-Keogh [H.R. io] investments ...
"MR. ROBERTSON. Under my proposal the [federal banking] Commission would have all the
regulatory powers and functions that are now vested in any one of these three Federal banking agencies.
The question of where the power lies as between the Securities and and Exchange Commission and the
Comptroller of the Currency would not be affected. My own feeling is the Securities and Exchange
Commission has greater competency in the field than does any bank supervisory agency and therefore,
I'd leave it in that Commission.
"SENATOR DOMINICK. So at the present minute you believe the commercial banks, so far as
common trusts and Smathers-Keogh funds are concerned, should be under the jurisdiction of the
Securities and Exchange Commission?
"MR. ROBERTSON. I do."
Hearing on the Nominations of Hugh F. Owens To Be a Member of the Securities and Exchange
Commission and James L. Robertson To Be a Member of the Federal Reserve Board, Before the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1964).
"' S. 1642, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. § 3(e) (1963) (as introduced). The Senate Committee, however,
with the agreement of the Commission, amended the bill to provide that these powers and duties shall
be vested in the respective bank regulatory agencies. S. Ra.- No. 379, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 31-36

(x963).
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control gives the bank investor much greater protection than any other investor. No one
should denigrate the direct supervision of banks as an effective means of public control.
The continuous internal supervision, regulation, and examination of banks by federal
and state bank supervisory agencies provides a protection to investors in banks which is
far greater than that afforded by disclosure alone. For example, the National Bank Act
requires that a complete examination at least three times in every 2-year period of the
books and records of each national bank must be made by a bank examiner employed
by the Comptroller of the Currency. Each of these examinations involves a detailed
analysis and valuation of the assets and liabilities of the institution. This supervision
provides protection for depositors and shareholders alike which is not available to investors in any other type of corporation.' °6
The Commission argued that the thrust of bank regulations was not the same as
that of the federal securities laws-the former, claimed the Chairman of the Commission, focused on the protection of the depositors, whereas the latter focused on
the protection of investors:
Accordingly, the only remaining issue is whether present practices of banks are such
that the purposes of S. x642 have already been satisfied. The great objectives of banking
regulation are controls over the flow of credit in the monetary system, the maintenance of
an effective banking structure, and the protection of depositors. These objectives neither
utilize the same tools nor achieve the same ends as investor protection. The purpose
of disclosure is to place the investor in a position to make an informed judgment on
the merits of a security, and to provide a basis for comparing that security with others
issued by companies in the same or different industries. Essentially this purpose is
achieved through the furnishing of financial information which provides a uniform pattern
of reporting based on understood and generally accepted accounting practices. To say
that bank regulation renders this disclosure philosophy unnecessary is to say that bank
regulation is an effective substitute for the free exercise of an investor's judgment. Con-

trols which protect against embezzlement and which assure adequate reserves serve important objectives, but not the objective of informed investment. To hold otherwise
would be to imply that, because of such regulation, bank securities are, without more,
worthy investmentsi-0
The argument was eventually resolved by the Senate in favor of the Commission's position. 0 8s However, the proposed amendments to the Securities Exchange
Act do not purport to disturb the exempt status of bank securities under the Securities
Act and it is, of course, the provisions of that act which govern the need for banks
1o6
Hearings on S. 1642 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency,
88th Cong.. Ist Sess. 175-76 (1963).
"o Id. at 54-55.
'10 S. x642, supra note 105, was passed by the Senate. At the time this article was written hearings
had been held by a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on the
Commission's proposals. The Subcommittee reported H.R. 6793, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), the House
version of S. 1642, to the full Committee on March 26, 1964. The House Committee reported the bill on
May i9, 1964. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). The Senate's action on the Commission's proposals should be contrasted with the recommendation of the Fascell Committee to the
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee to consider legislation which would specifically exempt
H.R. lo commingled funds from the federal securities laws and provide for such investor protections as
may be deemed necessary. H.R. REP. No. 429, 88th Cong., Ist Sss. 4 (1963).
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to register the interests in the commingled funds used as H.R. io investment media.
The technical legal argument for the banks is simple. If a security is issued in
connection with the creation of its commingled funds then the bank which created
the fund must be the issuer of that security. Since the security is one issued by a
bank, it is exempt from the provisions of the Securities Act by virtue of section
3(a) (2) of that act.' 0 9 One answer to that argument is that section 3(a) (2) only
exempts securities issued by a bank qua bank-that is, where the securities issued
represent an interest in or an obligation of a bank. The section 3(a) (2) exemption
is not available when a bank issues securities in its capacity as a trustee. The other
answer is that, as in the American depository receipt situation, it is the fund or trust
-and not the bank-which is the issuer."0 That answer immediately runs into
section 2(4) of the Securities Act which provides that
with respect to certificates of interest or shares in an unincorporated investment trust not
having a board of directors... the term "issuer" means the person or persons performing
the acts and assuming the duties of depositor or manager pursuant to the provisions of
the trust ...

under which such securities are issued ....

Since the bank performs the duties of manager or depositor in connection with the
commingled fund it would appear that it is the issuer of the securities and that the
section 3(a) (2) exemption problem is again raised. The answer to this contention
may lie in the legislative history of section 2(4) which indicates that in certain
situations in which securities were deposited pursuant to a trust or similar arrangement, the person holding the securities did not have the information relative to the
securities which was required to be included in the registration statement."' The
person who had the necessary information was the depositor or manager and,
accordingly, the responsibilities of an issuer were imposed on him rather than on the
trust or trustee which is the "actual issuer." 1 2 One example which may be cited
"' Section 3(a) (2) of the Securities Act exempts from its operations: ". .. any security issued or
guaranteed by any national bank, or by any banking institution organized under the laws of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, the business of which is substantially confined to banking and is
"
supervised by the State or Territorial banking commission or similar official ....
110A statement of the Commission's position in the analogous case of the American depository
receipt is contained in 22 SEC ANN. REP. 43 (1956). Cf. Supplemental Statement of Hon. Ganson
Purcell of the Securities and Exchange Commission, in 194z Hearings 1o8.
Although the language in the Commission's Prudential opinion, supra note 83 at zo & L.22, is not
clear, the Commission staff appears to be taking the position that for Securities Act purposes the Prudential Insurance Compay is the issuer of the interests in its variable annuity fund. The company filed the
registration statement for its group variable annuity accounts on the assumption that it was the issuer. File
No. 2-219o5. There is no exemption comparable to that contained in § 3(a) (2) for securities issued by
insurance companies and, thus, even if the variable annuity fund were the issuer for Securities Act purposes, the Prudential Insurance Company would probably have an issuer's liability as a controlling person
of the fund under § 15 of the Securities Act. If a bank cannot be held to an issuer's liability with respect
to the issuance of interests in its commingled fund solely because of the exemption in § 3(a) (a), it would
seem that the bank should not be held to an issuer's liability as a controlling person of the fund.
"1 H.R. REP. No. 85, 7 3d Cong., Ist Sess. 12 (1933). It may also be argued that § 2(4) addresses
itself solely to the question of who has the issuer's liability and does not deal at all with the question
of whether a registration statement is required.
222 Ibid.
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involves the American depository receipt instrument. That instrument originally
developed in a situation where an American investment banker was anxious to
facilitate the distribution of the shares of a foreign company. A bank was the
depository of the securities and issued receipts for them. The investment banking
firm retained the right to exercise managerial control over the deposit. A similarsituation occurs in connection with unit trusts created for the purpose of accumulating
investment company shares. In both cases, the depositor or manager initiates the
distribution of the securities and has the information which must be included in any
registration statement. It does not seem fair to place the duty and liability of an
issuer on the depository who plays essentially a passive role in the transaction. In
the H.R. iosituation, the trustee of the commingled fund is not a passive participant
and has all the information needed to comply with the disclosure provisions of the
Securities Act. Consequently, this is a situation where the language of section
2(4) must be interpreted in the light of the introductory clause of section 2--"unless
the context otherwise requires."
Although this interpretation makes the trust the issuer and avoids any section
3(a) (2) problem, it probably results in relieving the bank of an issuer's liability.
The second "except" clause of section 2(4) states that the trustee is not individually
liable as an issuer with respect to securities issued by a trust of which it is the trustee.
It is the trust which has the issuer's liability.' 13 However, this does not relieve the
bank entirely from responsibility for the content of the registration statement since
14
it is probably the underwriter of the securities issued.
Although the question of whether or not the Commission should have jurisdiction with respect to the activities of bank commingled funds was hotly contested,
there was no controversy with respect to the need for disclosure. The Comptroller
of the Currency pointed out that his office has "given great emphasis to disclosure.""' ,
He pointed with evident pride to the expanded disclosure requirements contained
in his new Regulation 916 Section 9 .i8(b)(i) of the Regulation provides that
"13See H.R. REP. No. z838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1934).

Query, however, whether the bank

has a controlling person's liability under section 15 of the Securities Act.
..4 Some banks have apparently decided to wait out the resolution of the conflict between the
Commission and the Comptroller of the Currency by confining the offer of participations in H.R. io
commingled funds to residents of the state in which they are incorporated and are doing business. They
would, therefore, be exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities Act by virtue of the
provisions of § 3(a)(ii). Any bank offering interests in an H.R. so commingled fund in reliance on this
exemption would have to be sure that no interest in the fund is, at any time, offered or sold to any nonresident of the state. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434, Dec. 6, x961. Since employee participants
in the H.R. so plan are usually offered an opportunity to make voluntary contributions to the plan
which will be invested in the commingled fund, it seems that the bank must make sure that not only
the participating employer but also all his employees are residents of the state.
... Fascll Hearing 44. However, he insisted that disclosure was less important than the kind of
regulation to which banks were subject. He said:
"Yet this [disclosure] can never be a substitute, in any sense of the term, in my opinion, for the
intensive, continuing intimate regulation of the business as occurs in banking." Ibid.
"" itshould be noted that these requirements of Regulation 9 apply only to national banks and not
to state banks such as the Chase Manhattan Bank, insofar as commingled funds used only for qualified
plans (in'eluding H.R. o plans) are concerned. For, although state banks must in general comply with
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each commingled fund must be established and maintained in accordance with
a written plan and that this plan must be filed with the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency. This plan must, at a minimum, explain how the fund is to
be operated; the investment powers given to the bank with respect to the fund;
the allocation of income, profits and losses between principal and income accounts;
the terms and conditions governing the admission or withdrawal of participants in
the fund; the auditing of accounts of the bank with respect to the fund; the basis,
method and the minimum frequency for valuing the assets in the fund, and the basis
upon which the fund can be terminated." 7 Section 9 .i8(b) (5)provides that each
fund must annually prepare a financial report which also must be filed with the
Office of the Comptroller of Currency. This report must contain a list of the investments in the fund, showing the current market value of each investment; a
statement showing purchases, sales and any other investment changes; a statement
of income and disbursements; and notations as to any investment in default for the
period covered by the report. Any person who requests a copy of the plan is entitled
to receive it. Similarly, any person who requests a copy of the annual report is
entitled to receive it. In addition, a copy of the annual report must be furnished, or
notice of its availability must be sent to each person to whom a periodic accounting
would ordinarily be rendered.
Expanded disclosure requirements were also a feature of the proposed Bank
Collective Investment Fund Act of x9631" which the American Bankers Association
supported as a method for solving the dispute between the Office of the Comptroller
and the Securities and Exchange Commission. This proposed act sought to exempt
from the application of the federal securities laws interests in bank commingled
funds (including interests in funds used as an investment medium by pension and
profit-sharing plans which are exempt from income tax). In return for such exemption, the Bank Collective Investment Fund Act would have imposed certain disclosure requirements upon such commingled funds. Section 6(b) of the act specifically
authorized the Comptroller of the Currency to make such rules and regulations as
he deemed appropriate "for the disclosure of relevant information to persons having
interests in accounts presently or prospectively participating in such collective investment funds.""" The act went on to impose certain minimum disclosure requirements. Sections 6(c) and (d) of the act, concerning the plan describing the fund,
Regulation 9 in the operation of their common trust funds in order to obtain the favorable tax treatment
accorded such funds by § 584 of the Internal Revenue Code, commingled funds used only for qualified
pension plans can qualify for tax exemption under §§ 401(a) and 5o(a) of the Code and are therefore
not dependent on § 584. Rev. Rul. 56-267, 1956-I CUm. BULL. 206.
"' There is also a catch-all closing phrase requiring the plan to contain provisions relating to "such
other matters as may be found necessary to define clearly the rights of participants in the fund."
11' S. 2223, H.R. g4 9 9 , 88th Cong., ist Sess. (1963). Congressman FasceU introduced an identical
bill in December 1963. H.R. 9410, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Commerce and Finance of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 8499 and
H.R. 9410 were scheduled to begin on June 9, 1964.
5' The Comptroller is also given broad exemptive powers under § 6(i) of the act.
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are roughly equivalent to section 9 .i8(b) (i) of the Comptroller's Regulation 9.
Section 6(e) of the act, which refers to the annual financial report which the commingled fund is required to issue, is more detailed than the comparable provision
in section 9 .i8(b) (5) of Regulation 9. It requires a detailed listing of all assets
and liabilities of the fund, showing both the cost and market value of the assets
and concentration by major fields. In addition, it requires a statement of increases
or decreases in gross asset valuation since the last prior report, a statement of earnings,
a statement of realized gains and losses, and a statement of investments purchased,
sold or redeemed since the last prior report. Section 6(f) of the act requires that
at or prior to the time of the first participation of any account in the collective investment fund, a copy of the plan as currently in effect (or a summary of it) and a copy
of the latest financial report be furnished, with respect to each such participating
account, to all non-bank co-fiduciaries of each such participating account and to each
person who has the right to be consulted about investments or to amend or revoke
the terms of the instrument creating the account.i2" Section 6(e) of the act requires
that thereafter these same persons must either receive copies of annual reports and of
any amendments to the plan or be given notice that such documents will be furnished
to them on request without charge.1 1
The Commission objected to this compromise bill. In a letter to Senator Willis
Robertson, the Chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, dated
November 27, I963," the Chairman of the SEC stated that the standards of disclosure in the Bank Collective Investment Fund Act were "meager and inadequate"
when compared to those imposed by the Securities Act. He pointed out that, under
the Bank Collective Investment Fund Act, banks may solicit investment in their
funds by using sales literature unaccompanied or preceded by anything in the nature
of a prospectus.= The prospectus Substitute contemplated by the act could consist
of a copy of the plan creating the fund (which might be a complex legal document)
and a copy of a financial report for the latest year. Such a requirement did not, he
wrote, insure that the investor would be told what his rights in the fund were in an
intelligible form. He went on to state that disclosure of certain fundamental matters,
such as the persons who perform the advisory functions for the fund (which, he
pointed out, did not need to be the bank) or the investment performance of the
fund, were not required. He also commented on the difference between making
...As drafted, § 6(f) of the Bank Collective Investment Fund Act would not require furnishing of the
plan and latest financial report to employees who make voluntary contributions to their H.R. lo trust,
since such employees normally do not have the right to amend or revoke the terms of such trust.
"' The comment made in note i2o supra applies equally here.
122 1o9 CoNG. Rac. 23997 (daily ed. Dec. x9, x963).
... Under present § 9.I8(b)(5)(iv) of Regulation 9, it appears that the bank cannot use any sales
literature describing the fund. Publicity is confined to distribution of the annual report and the
publication of a summary of the report in a newspaper of general circulation where the principal office of

the bank is located. The availability of the report may be given publicity in connection with the
promotion of the fiduciary services of the bank. As pointed out at note 116 supra, however, these
restrictions do not necessarily apply to state banks in connection with their commingled pension fund
activity.
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annual financial reports available and requiring them to be mailed to the participants.
Finally, he asserted that the Bank Collective Investment Fund Act deprived investors of the kind of civil remedies provided by the federal securities laws to redress
1 24
failure to make the required disclosures.

The issue appeared to be how much disclosure is enough. The question of who
should have the power to ensure that proper disclosure would be made seemed to
be a secondary consideration-at least in the mind of the Chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission. When asked whether he would be satisfied if the
federal securities laws were applied to bank commingled funds with administrative
responsibility, however, being vested solely in the Comptroller of the Currency, he
replied:
I cannot sit here and commit my Commission to a policy position on that. But I
would say it is a different question, and I am quite free to recognize it.
In other words, we are not fighting for jurisdiction in that sense.
... I don't feel I spend my life here worrying about the loss of a small facet of one's
activities, or prospective loss of it. If we knew
it were going to be fully handled by
125
another agency, it would be a different question.
On the other hand, the Chairman pointed out in the letter to Senator Robertson that

"governmental efficiency and uniformity of treatment would be best served by having
the federal securities laws administered by one agency"--the Commission.

2

"'It may be possible to imply a civil remedy from § 9 of the Bank Collective Investment Fund Act

which makes it a crime, punishable by a fine not to

exceed $25,000,

for any bank to willfully violate any

provision of the act, or to willfully, in a plan or report filed under the act, make any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to prevent the statements made
from being materially misleading.
The objections to the Bank Collective Investment Fund Act went beyond the inadequacies of the
disclosure provisions. Chairman Cary's letter indicates that the Commission's basic quarrel was with
the provision of a separate standard of regulation for collective investment funds maintained by banks.
He wrote:
"This technique underscores the fundamental criticism which the Commission has of the bill.
The bill says, in effect, that even though a bank merchandises interests in one of its collective investment
funds to the public, it has not entered the securities business. It is the Commission's position that the
bank has, at that point, entered the securities business, and that the same rules for investor protection
should, at that point, be applicable to the bank as are applicable to other persons in the securities
business. The emphasis of the Congress and the Commission over the last 3o years has been on the
development of uniform rules for the protection of all investors. No purpose seems to be served by
enacting special legislation for the protection of investors whose contact with the securities business is
through banks merely because the banks have decided that the securities business is a profitable one in
which to engage." lo9 CONG. Rc. 23998 (daily ed. Dec. i9, 1963).
The letter went on to state that the bill appeared to be a technique for avoiding adequate congressional consideration of the important policy questions raised by the banks' entry into the securities
business.
"One reason that the bill has been drafted to deny that banks have entered the securities business in
certain of their commingled fund activity apparently is to avoid any problems which might be raised
under those portions of the Glass-Steagall Act which prohibit commercial banks from engaging in
such business. To the extent that such problems exist, Congress will no doubt .wish to deal with them
directly. They should not be disposed of by a drafting technique, particularly when such technique would
entail the loss of important safeguards for investors." Ibid.
121 Fascell Hearing 16.
1. As pointed out in note io 5 supra, S. 1642 vested administrative responsibility for certain provisions
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A. The Commingled Fund and the Investment Company Act
The commingled fund, no less than the individual pension trust, fits the definition of investment company contained in section 3 of the Investment Company Act.
However, although there may be cogent reasons to exempt an employer's individual
pension plan from the provisions of that act, none of these reasons support an
exemption for the commingled fund in which such plans might invest. If Scudder,
Stevens and Clark, for example, had decided not to permit H.R. io plans to fund
their investments in its already established mutual funds, but had instead created
a new mutual fund solely for the purpose of funding such plans, it is hard to imagine
in what way the new fund would be operated differently than its already established
funds (which must comply with the Investment Company Act).
Section 3(c) (I) of the Investment Company Act which excepts from the
definition of investment company employees' pension trusts meeting the conditions
of section 165 (now section 401) of the Internal Revenue Code has, however, always
been interpreted to extend to the commingled funds in which such trusts were
invested if such commingled funds themselves were ruled to qualify for tax exempThe Internal Revenue Service has ruled that such qualition under section 4oI.
fication is met by a U.S. commingled fund if it is adopted as part of the plans under
which the participating trusts are created, and if the instrument governing the
commingled fund expressly limits participation to trusts which meet the requirements
of section 4oi, prohibits property in the commingled fund from being diverted to any
purpose other than the exclusive use of the participants in the fund, and prohibits
any interest in the commingled fund from being assignable. 128 As was pointed
of the Securities Exchange Act in the bank regulatory agencies. However, that cession of authority would
not seem to be a precedent for granting these agencies the power to administer the federal securities laws
as they apply to bank-sponsored commingled funds. In the first case, the provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act in question apply to the bank itself-and the bank regulatory authorities have an expertise
with respect to the operation of the bank business. On the other hand, in the case of bank-sponsored
commingled funds, the federal securities laws would apply to the fund rather than to the bank-and it
is the Commission which has the expertise with respect to the operation of pools of securities.
2" The special treatment under the Investment Company Act implied for employees' securities companies by § 6(b) of the act does not apply to bank commingled funds since such funds do not fit the
definition of an employees' securities company contained in § 2(a)(13) of the act.
1"' Rev. Rul. 56-267, r956-I Cus . BULL. 206. There may be an' additional exemption with respect
to bank commingled funds under § 3(c)() of the Investment Company Act. This section exempts
from the definition of investment company "any common trust fund or similar fund maintained by a
bank exclusively for the collective investment and reinvestment of monies contributed thereto by the
bank in its capacity . . . as a trustee." It may be argued that the contributions to the commingled fund
were made by the bank as the trustee of the individual participating trusts. The Commission accepts
this argument if the individual participating trusts were created for bona tide fiduciary purposes, as
that term was defined by the Federal Reserve Board in the 25 years during which it supervised the
opeartion and administration of common trust funds. When interests in the commingled fund are
merchandised to the public as investment media, the Commission (as did the Federal Reserve Board) has
taken the position that the participating trusts are not created for bona fide fiduciary purposes. In the
case of commingled funds for H.R. 1o plans, the Commission apparently believes that the investment
appeal qf the commingled fund is central to the creation of the relationship between the bank and its
H.R. io customer: The creation of t~e H.R. so trust is incidental to the relationship. Put another way ,
the Commission seems to assume that the employer is, in effect, offered a participation in the com-
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out above the legislative history of section 3(c) (I3) is not very helpful in determining why this exemption was put into the Investment Company Act. Perhaps the
application of the exemption to the commingled fund reflects a judgment about
the importance of encouraging the creation of pension plans (including small ones
whose assets must be commingled with the assets of other pension plans to achieve
efficient management and adequate diversification) weighted against the cost and

perhaps the efficacy of the investor protections provided by the Investment Company
Act. Such a judgment may have been easier to make at a time when it was assumed
that the participating employers in such commingled funds were persons able to fend
for themselves 29 Some weight may also have been given to the fact that such
commingled funds were normally sponsored by banks which themselves were already
subject to a certain degree of oversight' 3 In addition, extending the Investment
Company Act to such funds raised the difficult question of who should receive the
right to vote. If the trustee of the participating trusts had the power to vote, the
bank would normally control the fund.' 3 ' Another solution would have been to
give the vote to the employer. However, that would give no voice to those employees
who had made contributions to the employee pension trust or who had acquired
vested rights in the trust.
Since it seemed clear that the Treasury would rule that H.R. io commingled
funds qualified for tax exemption under section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code,
the Commission undoubtedly felt a strong pressure to extend to such funds the
same exemption it had extended to the other commingled funds. The situations
could have been distinguished. The employer-participants in this fund were clearly
not able to fend for themselves. Moreover, the problem of who should have the vote
mingled fund and that the creation of the employer trust is the technical device by which such investment
is permitted.
ass Rule 3c-3 of the General Rules and Regulations under the Investment Company Act, 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.3c-3, exempts certain group deposit administration contracts and the segregated accounts in which
they are funded from the provisions of the Investment Company Act if the contracts meet certain conditions. Recently the Commission proposed an extension of this exemption to groiup variable annuity
contracts. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 3957, April 13, 1964. One of the conditions which
the group deposit administration contracts and group variable annuity contracts must meet to qualify for
the exemption is that, at the time the contract is executed, it must cover at least 25 employees. See
p. 821 and note 31 supra for a discussion of Rule 156 which provides a similar exemption from the
Securities Act. This condition may provide some assurance that the employer will be able to exercise a
sufficient degree of supervision over the activities of the insurance company sponsor of the commingled
fund so that he may not be in need of the protections afforded by the Investment Company Act. However, the Commission has never applied this reasoning to investment companies in those situations where
each shareholder was required to be a substantial investor. The Exchange Fund of Boston, for example,
required each shareholder to make an initial investment of at least $25,000, but this did not affect its
status under the Securities Act or the Investment Company Act.
I" The extent to which bank regulation differs from the regulation contemplated by the Investment
Company Act is discussed in the Fa.cell Hearing 11-13, 44-46.
""'Even: if the bank had majority control, some purpose might be served by making the commingled
fund account to the minority of non-bank co-fiduciaries. Major dissatisfaction on the part of such cofiduciaries would probably cause the fund to change the policies which caused such dissatisfaction. However, the same purpose would probably be served by enforcing the disclosure provisions of the federal
securities laws.
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would be simplified. Since the interests of all employee and employer participants in

H.R. rO trusts vest immediately, it would make sense to allocate voting rights in
accordance with such vested rights. 1 2 The statutory basis for the distinction might
have been based on the restriction of the section 3(c) (13) exemption to "employee"
pension trusts. H.R. IOcovers self-employed persons' pension trusts. The drafting
technique which the Internal Revenue Code adopted to permit H.R. 1o trusts to
qualify under section 401 was to state that a self-employed person who met certain
qualifications would be called an employee for the purpose of applying section 401.
However, since the purposes of the Internal Revenue Code and Investment Company
Act are very different, there is no need to give the same interpretation to the term
employee as used in the Investment Company Act as is given to it in the Internal
Revenue Code. This is particularly true where, as in this case, the shift from
employee pension trusts to self-employed persons' pension trusts underscores the
greater need for investor protection. Some support for this approach may, perhaps,
be found in the use of the words "as amended" in section 3(c) (3). They were put
into the section the last time an amendment was made in section 401 which substantially affected the qualifications which a trust had to meet in order to qualify
under section 4I.P'3 The words were added so that the change made would be read
into section 3(c) (P3)134 The language used is much narrower than the broad--"as
heretofore or hereafter amended"--which is used in section 2(a) (42) of the Investment Company Act.1 33 However, the Commission considered that the policy which
is reflected in section 3(c) (I3) of the act indicated that the exemption clearly should
extend to H.R. 1o plans at the level of the individual employer fund; and it has
not attempted under this act to apply different treatment at the level of the commingled fund.
As a consequence of the extension of the section 3(c) (13) exemption to H.R .io

commingled funds, considerable pressure by competitors of the banks (banks were the
primary beneficiaries of this construction) for a compensating exemption could
be expected. The pressure came almost immediately. The Prudential Insurance
Company of America desired to participate in what it conceived to be the lucrative
market for H.R. 1o business. However, its commingled fund (a variable annuity
account) did not quite fit the language in the section 3(c) (13) exemption because
"' 5 In those pension trusts where the rights of the participants do not vest immediately, the problem
of who should vote on behalf of the holders of contingent interests is presented. One possible solution
would be to distribute that vote among the holders of vested interests. Other solutions would be to
permit the employer to exercise that vote or to let the holders of the contingent interests themselves
exercise the vote.
'a The Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 61g, 56 Stat. 798 (1942), added provisions that were intended
to prevent employers from establishing plans which discriminate in favor of top management.
...See S. RtEP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1942).
"'It is interesting to note that the present policy of the House Legislative Counsel is to avoid use of
the phrase "as heretofore or hereafter imended" in statutes when the intintion is in fact to refer to a
statute as "heretofore or hereafter amended." This was made express in the House report on the Commission's pending legislative program. See H.R. PE. No. 5458, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 '(x964).
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it was not a trust.138 The argument advanced for granting the exemption rests on
the theory that Prudential had fiduciary duties very similar to those of the trustees

of a commingled fund; that applying the Investment Company Act to Prudential
and not to its leading institutional competitor would put it at a severe (and congressionally unintended) economic disadvantage; and, finally, that insurance com13
panies, no less than banks, were heavily regulated
CONCLUSION

Any consideration of employee or H.R. IO benefit plans must make a sharp dis-

tinction between two factual levels. The first is the level of the individual plan
and the relation to it of the employee participants. The second is the level of the
investment medium which is used to fund the individual plan and the relation to
that medium of the employer who sets up the plan and chooses the investment
medium.
At the level of the individual plan, the Commission has under the Securities Act
followed a hands-off policy with respect to all plans except those involving the sale
to employees of securities in the employer company. The Commission's policy developed during a period when the need for legislation designed to protect the interests
of plan participants had not been clearly established; and it was guided by the fact
that the Securities Act had neither been intended nor designed for widespread
application to protect the interests of participants in all kinds of welfare and pension
plans. The evolution of the Commission's hands-off policy is thus understandable.
Its continuation is appropriate. For, although there may once have been some
reason for applying the protections of the Securities Act at the individual plan level
to plans not involving the sale of employer securities, this has no longer been the case
since the enactment by Congress of the Federal Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. The Federal Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act is specifically
designed to provide at the individual plan level the protections which Congress has
decided are appropriate for participants in the many kinds of welfare and pension
plans which eixst. Thus, for all plans except those involving the sale of employer
securities, the Federal Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act rather than the
Securities Act should be looked to as the embodiment of congressional policy. The
Commission's hands-off policy under the Securities Act harmonizes with this result.
However, as discussed above, the Commission's hands-off policy has not been incorporated in interpretative or exemptive rules; indeed, the Commission's power to
adopt an exemptive rule is limited by the $300,000 ceiling which is presently contained
in section 3 (b) of the act. The consequence is that at least some employee and H.R.
io plans are continuously being subjected at the individual plan level to possible
...
When Prudential filed its registration statement under the Securities Act, it did not file a registration statement under the Investment Company Act.
""The first and third reasons appear to apply with equal force to the argument that Prudential's
variable annuity fund which is available to all members of the public should be exempted from the
Investment Company Act.
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liability under section 2(i) of the Securities Act for their failure to register under
that act and to comply with its prospectus requirements. Although this liability
is probably not of practical significance in most cases, the fact that it exists is nevertheless unfortunate. Accordingly, it would seem appropriate for the Commission
to incorporate its hands-off policy in interpretative and exemptive rules under the
Securities Act up to the extent of its present powers; and to recommend to the
Congress that section 3 (b) of the act be amended so that the Commission's exemptive
rule for such plans can apply without regard to that section's present $3o0,000 ceiling.
With respect to the applicability of the Investment Company Act at the level of
the individual plan, section 3(c) (I) of the Investment Company Act provides an
exemption for all employee trusts which qualify under section 401 of the Internal
Revenue Code. The Commission has, not without at least some difficulty, construed
this exemption as applying to qualified H.R. io trusts as well as qualified employee
trusts. Such a construction of the exemption appears appropriate. To the extent
that the exemption may reflect a congressional judgment that an adequate substitute
for the protections of the Investment Company Act is provided by the requirements
which are imposed upon such trusts under the Internal Revenue Code, the exemption should extend to H.R. io trusts since these factors will be present to the same
degree with respect to these trusts as with respect to employee pension trusts.
Moreover, to the extent that the section 3(c) (3) exemption reflects a congressional
judgment that the burdens of compliance with the Investment Company Act ought
not to be imposed on qualified trusts or on the employers setting them up, the
exemption is if anything even more appropriate for H.R. io trusts than for employee
pension trusts since H.R. io trusts generally will be established by smaller employers
and will cover fewer persons than employee pension trusts.
The Investment Company Act does not provide an automatic exemption from
its provisions for employee benefit plans that do not qualify under section 401 of
the Internal Revenue Code. Section 6(b) of the act does, however, direct the Commission to grant exemptions from the provisions of the act to "employees' securities
companies" if and to the extent that this is consistent with the protection of investors. Since the varieties of arrangements which can fit the act's definition of
an "employees' securities company" can run the gamut from plans having all or
many of the employee protections characteristic of qualified plans to plans having few
or none of such protections, the flexibility which the act gives the Commission is
appropriate. The Commission, however, has failed adequately to articulate general
standards which should govern the granting or denial of exemptions under section
6(b) of the act. Even though relatively few applications have so far been filed under
this section, the failure of the Commission to articulate such standards is unfortunate.
It would seem that one of the possible tools for assisting the decision-making process
in this area is the exemption provided by section 3(c)(I3) of the act. The policy
reflected by that section would suggest that the Commission should, for example, be
liberal in granting complete or nearly complete exemptions to nonqualified plans
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to the extent that these have the essential employee protections contained in qualified
plans. It would seem that another factor which should be considered under section
6(b) today is the extent to which the Federal Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure
Act applies to the arrangement and the nature of the protections it affords in the
particular case. Other things being equal, the Commission should probably be more
willing to grant exemptions to plans to which the Disclosure Act applies than to
plans or arrangements to which that act is inapplicable.
When one shifts his attention from the level of the individual plan to the level
of the commingled fund or other medium which may be chosen as the vehicle
for investing the assets of several individual plans, a different set of considerations
comes into play than is generally present at the level of the individual plan. The
relationship of the employer who establishes the individual plan to the sponsor of
the funding medium is essentially that of an individual with money available for investment to the seller of a security. Further, the sponsors of the funding medium
(insurance companies offering variable annuities, investment-company sponsors offering investment company shares, and banks offering interests in bank commingled
funds) are in the business of providing investment media. Thus, the typical situation
for application of the disclosure principles of the Securities Act exists at this level.
Nevertheless, historically the Commission has not generally imposed the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act where interests in such funding media
were sold exclusively to qualified employee pension plans. Although such funding
media were normally sponsored by banks, this position was not based on that fact.
When insurance companies began selling annuity contracts containing a segregatedfund variable feature (contracts which thus were securities) to qualified pension
plans, the Commission promulgated a rule which defined the private offering
exemption in a way which put the insurance companies in a very similar position
with respect to disclosure requirements as that enjoyed by banks offering interest&
in their commingled funds to qualified pension plans. The theory on which the
position with respect to both the bank and insurance company sponsored offerings
rests is that the offers would be made to persons who could fend for themselvesand thus the private offering exemption should be available.
This approach reflects a proper concern by the Commission for the protection
of investor interests. Distinctions should not be made on the basis of who sponsors
the commingled fund. The extent to which the sponsor of the fund is regulated
does not affect the investor's need for the kind of information which permits him
to choose, from among various funding media, that medium which will best
serve his investment objectives. And it is the underlying philosophy of the federal
securities laws that decisions about the fund to be used should rest with the investor.
The Commission's pre-H.R. io belief, that interests in commingled funds sold
to qualified pension plans were being sold to persons who did not require the help
of the federal securities laws in obtaining the information they needed in order
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to evaluate the comparative quality of investment media suitable for their pension
plans, was probably never fully in accord with the facts surrounding all offerings
or sales of such interests. Nevertheless, it probably was sufficiently in accord with
the facts surrounding the preponderance of offerings and sales of such interests to
constitute a defensible basis for the administrative policy which the Commission
adopted. On the other hand, the circumstances which bankers themselves have
indicated would surround the offerings of H.R. io commingled funds, plus a recognition that the employers who would be setting up H.R. io plans would in general
not be well equipped to fend for themselves, indicated to the Commission that the
private offering exemption could not realistically be applied to H.R. io commingled
funds. Although several professional or trade associations like the American Bar
Association and the American Medical Association have registered the H.R. xo banktrusteed commingled funds which they are sponsoring for their members, and one
bank has itself registered its H.R. io funds, the banking industry, with the encouragement of the Comptroller of the Currency, has in general strongly resisted the
Commission's position. The American Bankers Association has proposed legislation
which is designed to remove bank-sponsored investment funds from the scope of
the Securities Act. The Commission has quite correctly opposed this legislation.
It is difficult to understand why investors in bank-sponsored investment funds should
be entitled to fewer protections than investors in investment funds sponsored by
others-or why banks should be afforded more favorable treatment when they decide
to sponsor investment funds than are other sponsors.
As for the applicability at the level of the commingled fund of the Investment
Company Act, the exemption which is provided by section 3(c) (13) of the act for
qualified plans does not literally distinguish between the level of the individual
plan and the level of the commingled fund. Accordingly, the commission has traditionally construed the exemption as extending at the commingled fund level to
funds which are used exclusively for pooling the assets of qualified employee plans.
The problem in dealing with the exemption in section 3(c) (13) is that there is no
legislative history which defines the purpose of the exemption. Two reasons for
the exemption-the protections written into the Internal Revenue Code and the
unwillingness to place the burdens of compliance with the Investment Company Act
on employers who are not in the investment company business-suggest themselves. Of these reasons, only that regarding the protections of the Internal Revenue
Code applies at the level of the commingled fund. Thus, for Investment Company
Act purposes as for Securities Act purposes, the meaningful place to draw distinctions in the pension plan area would appear to be at the level of the commingled fund. However, the wording of the exemption in section 3(c)(13) for
qualified pension trusts does not differentiate between the individual plan level
and the commingled fund level. Thus, when the Commission determined that
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the exemption should extend to H.R. io plans at the individual plan level, it also
extended it to H.R. io plans at the commingled fund level.
The resulting application of the section 3(c) (13) exemption to the H.R. io plan
at the commingled fund level, however, makes the task of articulating the policy
reasons for applying the provisions of the Investment Company Act to one kind of
fund and not to another more difficult in view of the similarity between the H.R. io
commingled fund and the typical investment company. It also suggests that in
certain other instances the investor protections which are accorded by the act may be
eroded through changes in the character of the activities of the funds which have
traditionally been exempted. It is just such erosion which, outside the pension
fund area, the Commission has so far successfully resisted in the sale of variable
annuities by insurance companies, and which it is currently resisting with respect
to the efforts of banks to commingle managing agency accounts or to expand the
activities of common trust funds without compliance with the Securities Act and
the Investment Company Act.
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